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Abstract
In safety critical systems, Safety Assurance Cases are created in order to provide
argumentation as to why a system is reasonably safe. In the automotive indus-
try, the ISO 26262 standard is complied with in order to provide comprehensive
and structured argumentation for developed electrical and/or electronic (E/E) sys-
tems in regards to function safety. Previous research, while seeing initial results
in improving traceability in Safety Assurance Cases, has expressed the importance
of creating trace-link between the safety related artefacts and elements in order to
provide the argumentation of as to why the complex real-world systems are safe.
By utilising the Design Science Research methodology a Traceability Information
Model emerged as the design artefact, which has been validated in an industrial set-
ting. The aim is to contribute in how traceability of Safety Assurance Cases can be
represented and what the appropriate relationships are. In this paper, the artefacts
which are important to traceability and the relevant relationships among them in
Safety Assurance Cases are presented and discussed. The results of this study could
help future research in identifying the important trace-links required to facilitate
the maintenance, by introducing traceability, in other industrial cases and provides
a starting point for work in automation of the creation of Safety Assurance Cases.
Keywords: Safety Assurance Cases, Traceability Information Model, Func-
tional Safety, ISO 26262, Traceability.
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Introduction
In safety critical systems, it is important to provide extensive evidence that the
product is up to safety standards, this can be expressed in a Safety Assurance
Case (SaAC)[3]. A top level approach is taken by decomposing safety requirements
and providing argumentation in order to argue that a certain part of a system is
safe. The argumentation is concerned with claims about a system, some of these
claims are tightly related to the safety requirements, but the requirement hierarchy
is not identical to the argumentation hierarchy. A SaAC includes and organises
claims, arguments and evidence [4]. A claim refers to a safety specification that
needs to be achieved in order to prove attained safety in that particular part of
the system. Arguments express how the evidence provided satisfy those claims.
Evidence usually consist of information in various shapes and types of documents
and is often contained in an artefact, which refers to an ISO 26262 work product
[5]. These documents can be, but are not limited to: test cases, reviews and safety
concepts. This study and the SaAC refers to what ISO 26262 refers to as safety
cases.
For automotive functional safety, in order to comply with appropriate safety
standards, the ISO 26262 series of standards [5] must be met. The ISO 26262 is
an instrument to secure that developed electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems
are safe in relation to functional safety. This means arguing that the system does
not malfunction, causing unreasonable risks [6]. Safety cases in this environment
are required to provide argumentation and evidence for the achievement of func-
tional safety. In order to achieve this, the safety case needs to progressively contain
the ISO 26262 work products. A work product is documentation that is produced
throughout the Safety life-cycle in order to facilitate the management of functional
safety [5] e.g., functional safety concept, software verification reports) [7]. A com-
plete argumentation based on those work products must then be created in order to
fully comply with the safety standards.
Even though the ISO 26262 on automotive functional safety requires full com-
pliance, it does not include guidelines on how to create and develop the safety
argumentation and evidence, nor how to evaluate the quality and completeness of a
safety cases. SaACs have the potential to aid in the maintenance, consistency and
support evolution of safety critical products [8]. Therefore, from a safety perspective
it is vital to the success of a product from a safety perspective to be consistent with
the changes in development but also to reflect the reality of the product.
A vital aspect to achieve these goals is traceability and therefore the goal of this
study is to improve upon the traceability of SaACs in a practical, industrial setting.
Attempts have been made in order to introduce traceability to the documents by
1
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keeping version control up to date over multiple sources [9]. While experiencing
positive results in research, the adoption of these practises in industry has seen
some initial but not yet any comprehensive results. Traceability is a key attribute
that is difficult to achieve using currently utilised workflows and methodologies in
industry. By proposing a new model for creating and maintaining SaACs which
benefits said attribute, a more streamlined and risk-averse workflow will be created
for use in industry [9]. Additionally, this research intends to close a gap between
research and industry by applying your research in an industrial context. Managing
a safety case through life is not a trivial process, as it needs to be maintained on an
accurate account of a system’s safety, through assessing various challenges that has
impact on the safety argument[10]. This study will focus on the industrial problems
faced by Volvo Group Trucks Technology, a Swedish OEM company, as the main
source of challenges faced in a real world environment. Three key challenges in
regards to maintaining SaAC will be addressed:
1) The first challenge directly involves the maintaining of the SaACs, where
they the lack supportive trace links information. Practitioners experience the main
obstacles in SaAC maintenance particularly in keeping the relevant documents con-
sistent and the traceability of information between artefacts and elements. This is
especially true in situations regarding changing requirements but also changes in the
product under development. Traceability become particularly difficult to attain in
SaACs as they grow too large and the complexity increases [11]. The main problem
in terms of maintenance is the lack of traceability. When a change is made, even a
small one, it takes a significant amount of time to trace the impacted artefacts and
elements of that change if traceability is not integrated [3].
2) The second challenge pertains to the difficulties that are faced to provide
traceability between the SaAC and the referenced artefacts. It is important for the
validity of a SaAC that all artefacts used in order to build the SaAC are up-to-date
[12]. This requires a version control check to keep track of the version(s) of the
components that are currently in use and make updates upon a component change
to ensure that the versions are compatible. It is also important to ensure that
the SaAC reflects the physical reality of the product, in regards to functionality
and behaviour. Any change should have a traceability link to the impact on the
corresponding safety argumentation.
3) The third and final challenge is to attempt to contribute to minimising the
gap between theory and real-world practices. Issues regarding traceability between
the various documents in a SaACs during the evolution of the product have been
the focus of some initial research, but have not yet been efficiently addressed [11].
Promising results have been found in research but they have not included the same
number of variables as industrial projects attempting to adopt the same strategies.
The conclusion of a number of experiments regarding traceability in SaACs is that
there is a need for further investigation and tooling in order to deal with the different
situations and variables that are present in industry [12]. In industry, evidence for
safety is found across multiple sources and in various formats. This is the main
difference from research where work has been performed with a very limited amount
of variables
This study focused on improving SaAC maintenance efficiency by the devel-
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opment of a Traceability Information Model (TIM). A new solution is proposed
that suggests a model to introduce traceability in SaAC that could be applied in
an industrial setting, using the case company as a primary data point on which
to develop the TIM. The focus was on facilitating the maintenance of SaACs by
providing the ability to manage change by introducing traceability in the context of
continually changing artefacts. Even though the focus of this study was on a specific
industrial case, an attempt was made to produce results that are generalised and
has the possibility be used in different real-world settings.
3
1. Introduction
4
2
Background
In order to provide the necessary background information needed for this study, this
section is divided into three different topics. The first topic describes what a SaAC
is, the benefits to the organisation, recommended method to work with SaAC, the
ISO 26262 standard and the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). The second topic
introduces the strong connection between Maintainability and Traceability and how
introducing traceability can improve the maintenance of SaACs. Finally, the third
topic describes what a TIM is and how it can help improve maintenance of SaACs.
2.1 Safety Assurance Cases & ISO 26262
In systems where safety is a critical aspect, an extensive argumentation for its com-
pliance to safety standard is important. In roadside vehicles, the safety of a systems
functional safety is expressed in a SaAC [3]. The SaAC should communicate an
argument, regarding that the system is acceptably safe for the user to operate in a
given context, which is both comprehensive and defensible [13].
SaACs are important to an organisation not only to reduce safety related risks
but also to decrease commercial risks. The creation of SaAC also provides a platform
for stakeholders to get involved and provide their reviews. Additionally, creating
SaAC provides a great incentive to focus on improving safety related activities,
present the use of accepted guidelines and standards and a means to express that
known potential vulnerabilities have been investigated [4].
In order to decrease the overhead of working with SaAC, to achieve an effi-
cient workflow, the implementation of the idea of continuous assurance cases is of
upmost importance. These assurance cases are created, and updated, as part of the
development process instead of an item that is created after the development cycle
is complete. Warg et al. [14] argue that integrating assurance cases more tightly
with development and having the same support for versioning and product lines
for both activities is one crucial part of enabling continuous assurance. Separation
of Concerns, which is a design principle used to manage complexity and facilitate
re-use, enables the use of component-based assurance case fragments. It is advised
not to limit the handling of assurance cases to solely the experts in this domain but
the development teams need to be able to keep the assurance cases up to date as
part of releasing new functionality [14].
In order to comply with the ISO 26262 standard, which comprise guidelines
to secure that the functional safety in electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems is
acceptably safe, safety cases are created. To comply with the standard, the safety
5
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cases need to consecutively contain the ISO 26262 work products. A work product
in ISO 26262 refers to a document or a set of documents that are produced during
the safety life-cycle of a product [5].
One well known technique to express a SaAC is with the GSN [15]. It is
a graphical argumentation notation made to represent and visualise elements in
a SaAC (claims, arguments & evidence) and the relationships between them. The
main purpose of representing the elements in a SaAC utilising the GSN is to visualise
how the claims about the system are broken down into sub-claims until the claims
can be supported by a direct evidence regarding the system safety [13].
2.2 Maintenance & Traceability
The creation and approval of SaAC is a challenge for practitioners, especially when
the cases become large and complex. Explicit and implicit dependencies are intro-
duced and the SaACs become increasingly hard to maintain [3]. Without traceability
to and between the artefacts and elements of a SaAC, a small change can take a
significant amount of time to both trace and update throughout the case. Addition-
ally, the confidence in that all effects of a change have been addressed is decreased
without the assurance from implemented traceability [3].
Guiding developers to identify parts of SaAC that can be affected by a change
can aid in maintenance of the cases. This can be done by establishing relationships
between different components of the system. When a change occurs, it will be
visible for practitioners which the sensitive elements and their dependencies are.
The established relationships will indicate which other elements might have been
affected by the change, which will reduce maintenance time in terms of identifying
which elements should be examined after a change is made [16]. Traceability plays a
very important role in identifying the evidence required in a SaAC but also becomes
important when assessing if all the evidence needed is available in the case [17].
2.3 Traceability Information Models
Previous research has shown the need for traceability in SaACs. Some results have
been produced in this area but few attempts have been made in order to implement
these in an industrial setting. Traceability in SaAC focuses on establishing relation-
ships between artefacts and how they interact in light of change. This becomes more
and more important as a system grows in size and complexity. A big part of SaAC
traceability regards versioning of the current artefacts in use and keeping those ver-
sions up to date. There are many important traces that need to be established in a
SaAC. These traces are, but not limited to, those between the artefacts, between ev-
idence and claims, between evidence and arguments and versions of a single artefact.
The traces between claims, arguments and evidence regards traceability within the
SaAC. Traces between claims/evidence and artefacts regards traceability between
the SaAC and artefacts external to the case [12].
Nair et al. [12] created a “Traceability Information Model for Safety Evidence”
called SafeTIM. It builds upon creating class diagrams and classes with certain
6
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predefined attributes such as version and references. However, the authors states
that this model is still in need of additional tool support in order to simplify the
adoption by industrial cases [12]. The main challenges for enabling traceability in
SaACs are that artefacts and evidence can be spread over multiple sources and
locations, the sheer amount of artefacts can be overwhelming. This is especially
true if the information is stored in different tools.
Taguchi et al. [18] present their TIM which is related to the GSN and criteria
for how to validate and evaluate if the traceability is adequate in a safety case. The
GSN diagram is divided into the various phases of development and traceability links
are created both between and within the phases. The validation criteria proposed
for traceability with respect to ISO 26262 is summarised as follows: A collection
of GSN diagrams has complete traceability coverage if all traceable artefacts fed to
the TIM are referenced in the diagrams as evidence. The collection has forward
coverage if indexed diagrams reference a traceable unit in one solution (S2) with a
reference to the previous version of the traceable unit in solution (S1).
In this study, an attempt was made to build upon existing solutions [12, 18]
in order to create a TIM at the case company which would help the practitioners to
improve the maintainability, by introducing traceability, of their SaACs. Although
these two TIMs were the main sources of inspiration, we did investigate additional
TIMs that were created for other domains. However, the focus was on vehicle related
TIMs and the automotive industry.
7
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3
Research Questions
By reviewing currently employed methods by the case company to implement trace-
ability in their SaACs and the existing body of knowledge in the area, the following
research questions emerged.
• RQ1: How can we trace the relevant relationships in SaAC and the
containing elements to their relevant development artefacts?
– RQ1.1: How can we describe the relevant relationships among
artefacts and elements of the SaAC?
– RQ1.2: What are the relevant relationships among artefacts and
elements of the SaACs?
Based on findings from previous studies, it is clear that traceability is a substan-
tial aspect of maintainability in SaACs. It is also evident that research regarding
traceability in SaAC is a pressing and important topic as of today. There have been
significant results in attempting to introduce traceability in SaAC but the differences
between findings in research and the real-world settings that SaACs are developed
in has not yet been entirely addressed. This study will focus on how traceability can
be utilised in SaACs created and developed in an industrial setting, in order to im-
prove the maintenance of these cases. Traceability regards the relationships that is,
or can be created between different elements or components in a system [16]. Iden-
tifying these relationships are key to answer RQ.1 on how can we trace the relevant
relationships in SaAC and the containing elements to their relevant development
artefacts. Therefore, by answering the two sub-questions on how the relationships
can be described and what the relationships are, we can make an attempt to answer
RQ.1
Answering RQ.1.1 required analysing existing studies and identifying the most
suitable solution for the case company and answering the RQs. A suitable model to
present this information and provide a solution for better maintainability built on
traceability information for the SaAC was needed.
Answering RQ.1.2 required identifying the structure utilised for a SaAC. Fur-
thermore, the structure needed to be analysed in order to provide the list of elements
within it and additional elements needed to be identified. The additional elements
regards the ones that are necessary references from within the development process
and are required to support the SaAC artefact to provide trace information for ac-
complishing tasks regarding maintainability. Further analysis was needed in order
to specify the nature of the relationships among identified elements and artefacts.
In order to answer RQ.1, the identification of a way to enhance traceabil-
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ity presentation within specific environment was required. The analysis took into
consideration that any solution available needed to focus on supporting the main-
tainability of SaACs. In order to validate the approach, information was collected
regarding the system deployed in the case company. A synchronisation of the evo-
lution of the product and the evolution of the SaACs was executed. This was done
in order to support Maintainability, which would through this synchronisation be
affected and improved. How this was addressed was through the implementation of
traceability.
The guidelines in the paper written by Agee [19] have been adhered to. Agee
discusses the appropriate construction and wording of good research questions, the
structure of the overarching questions and their sub-questions and how to clearly
convey the purpose of the study.
10
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Methods
This thesis was conducted in collaboration with the Swedish OEM company Volvo
Group Trucks Technology (GTT), in particular with their Functional Safety depart-
ment. The case company is one of the largest heavy-duty truck brands in the world;
with trucks sold and serviced in over 140 countries.
The Design Science Research (DSR) methodology [20] was utilised. The pro-
cess of a design science research is an iterative approach that consists of a number
of cycles. Each one comprises five phases: Awareness of Problem, Suggestion, De-
velopment, Evaluation and Conclusion. When a cycle is complete, the generated
output is used as input for the upcoming one [21].
The DSR method was chosen because it is a solution-oriented approach to a
business problem, which is stated as one of Hevners [20] guidelines on DSR. An
additional reason for choosing the DSR method was because this would enable the
development of the solution backed by existing studies that also fulfils the company’s
requirements, which clearly indicated that the study would need to take on an
iterative approach with an artefact as the generated solution.
Three iterations were conducted at the case company with the goal to provide
the company with a solution that they could utilise in order to facilitate the main-
tenance of their SaACs in regards to traceability. Another goal was to propose a
general solution that can be utilised in safety critical systems when creating SaACs.
4.1 Iterative cycle
The following is a description of what each cycle in the iteration entails.
4.1.1 Awareness of Problem
The first phase of the cycle is focused on achieving an in depth understanding of
the problem domain in order to enable the attempts to propose relevant solutions
for said problem. During this phase of the study, the focus was on eliciting a deeper
understanding of traceability in SaACs, traceability information models and the
particular problems faced in industry in relation to this study.
4.1.2 Suggestion
In the second phase of the cycle, different solution proposals are explored and eval-
uated based on the findings in the awareness of the problem phase. If a proposed
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suggestion is found to be suitable it is carried over to the next phase. However, the
possibility that no suggestion is appropriate is also a possibility. In this study, the
suggestion comprised of different solution artefacts in the various iterations. In the
first iteration, the proposed suggestion comprised of a list of methods that could
be utilised by the case company in order to introduce traceability to SaACs, and
subsequently improve maintainability of these cases. In the second iteration, the
suggestion was a TIM that was developed in order to increase traceability and im-
prove maintainability in SaACs, while also being feasible in an industrial setting.
In the third iteration the suggestion comprised of a proposal of a way to conduct
an analytical evaluation of the TIM by applying it on existing SaACs. The aim was
to identify issues both with the model, but also current practises in industry that
inhibits traceability and maintainability of SaACs.
4.1.3 Development
The fourth phase, the development phase, is conducted by taking the suggestion
proposed in the previous step of the cycle and carrying out the development of said
suggestion. This was performed by presenting the methods to SaACs, functional
safety and ISO 26262 experts at the case company, refining and extending the pro-
posed TIM solution and by applying the TIM on existing SaACs as mentioned in
the previous section.
4.1.4 Evaluation
In the fourth phase, the artefact generated from the development phase is evaluated
against the problem or problems found in the awareness of problem phase of the
cycle utilising appropriate evaluation methods. The primary method of evaluation
utilised in this study was expert evaluation of the developed artefact. Additionally,
in the final iteration, a focus group evaluation was conducted. The evaluation was
carried out by experts in SaACs, functional safety and the ISO 26262 standard in
combination with findings of previous studies in relation to traceability in SaACs.
4.1.5 Conclusion
Finally, in the fifth and final phase of the cycle, the focus is on concluding the results
of the evaluation phase in order to answer the research questions of the study. The
conclusion is also utilised as the problem investigation phase for the following cycle.
4.2 Data collection
Five different techniques for data collection was utilised: Document review/analysis,
Participant observation, Focus Group, Expert evaluation and a Workshop. These
techniques were chosen due to both their applicability and the amount of data that
could be elicited. The participant observation technique was used mainly in meetings
and workshops with the case company’s employees and experts in SaACs and func-
tional safety to achieve triangulation of the data elicited from the document review
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and vise versa. The workshops and expert evaluation methods were used primarily
as evaluation techniques but were also utilised as data collection techniques. Trian-
gulation of data is used to validate and compare data collected between at least two
different methods to identify any biases or divergence between the different sources
of data collected [22].
4.2.1 Document analysis
The primary method of data collection was document analysis. As expressed by
Bowen [23], document analysis is utilised to “elicit meaning, gain understanding,
and develop empirical knowledge“. The benefits of this technique are the availability
of documents and time efficiency of the data elicitation. The documents analysed
in this study comprised of, but were not limited to, instructions on how to write
SaACs according to the ISO 26262 standard, SaACs under development at the
case company, strategies regarding the company’s safety assurance process, process
documents and templates. A significant amount of documents were provided by the
case company and an extensive amount of data could therefore be elicited using the
document analysis method which would not have been so readily accessible using
other methods.
Analysing the instructions and template documents on how to write SaACs
according to the ISO 26262 standard made it possible to analyse the ongoing process
at the case company and the current state of implementing traceability to their
SaACs. A better understanding of the company’s structure and development process
was obtained, which would be useful in order to propose a solution that would benefit
the practitioners who would possibly be affected by the solution.
One of the disadvantages with the document analysis method for data collec-
tion is that the contents of the documents might contain insufficient detail, as they
are created for a certain purpose [23]. In order to mitigate this participant obser-
vation was chosen as another technique for data collection in the study in order to
obtain more details about what was learnt and discovered in the document analysis.
4.2.2 Participant Observation
The secondary method of data collection was conducting participant observations
at the case company. Participant observation can be expressed as the researcher
or researchers becoming a part of the team that works with the area regarding the
study. The researchers will observe the actors and derive relevant data from the work
being done and said [24]. This method was used as a lot of relevant information,
especially on a strategic level, is expressed in these meetings between experts while
interacting with each other. A number of workshops were attended, information and
strategy meetings regarding the company’s development of SaACs and ISO 26262
in relation to said SaACs. By attending these meetings and workshops insights into
the process was gained, goals and current strategies at the case company that would
have otherwise been difficult to obtain. The guidelines to participant observation
expressed by Mack [25] were followed. These guidelines include how to manage the
ethical, observational, note taking and analytical aspects of conducting participant
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observation. The guidelines were adhered to regarding taking notes during the
different observation occasions and field notes were expanded on accordingly (See
Appendix, A.9-A.12).
In this study, the participant observation data collected were focused on what
was being discussed among employees at the case company in meetings and work-
shops held for each other. This was done in order to gain insights into how the
organisation and their employees reason and work with SaACs and the ISO 26262
standard. In addition to the data gathered through documents’ review, the partici-
pant observation data highlighted the difference between guidelines that were created
and how far the organisation had come in order to adhere to these guidelines while
working with SaACs.
4.2.3 Expert Evaluation
The third method of data collection was Expert evaluation. This is a qualitative
method where experts can contribute freely with comments without pre-defined
heuristics. It is a fast and cost effective evaluation method [26]. Experts Evaluation
took place in form of meeting sessions, Where experts where invited into scheduled
sessions to address each iteration evaluation practice. In the expert evaluation the
researchers took the role of moderators to lead the session and assess the results,
while the evaluation from the experts was monitored. Expert evaluation was utilised
for the evaluation of the development of the TIM. The structure of the sessions were
designed to provide insights to the knowledge regarding the models applicability
and usefulness in terms of providing needed traceability information required for
maintenance tasks for the SaACs. Various factors have been considered following
the guidelines expressed by Klas [26] approach for performing the evaluation in each
session.
The first factor is the task, which is designed based “on the information need
to express the unknown” [26]. The task for each session was reviewing each of the
models classes in terms of reflecting a clear representation of elements that explore a
connection to the SaAC structure and availability of the trace links to the dependent
elements provided in the development process. The task also included evaluating the
associations between the classes, in order to determine if they represent the correct
connections and if they flow in a the right directions of how traceablity information
is available in the company’s systems.
The second factor was determining the group that would be preforming the
evaluation. An important aspect to consider here is that the group task and target
group that will be using the model should be an accurate reflection, meaning that the
“evaluators should be experts from the same community as the intended audience“
[26]. Therefore, the experts were employed at the case company and their field of
expertise were; SaACs, functional safety, R&D and the ISO 26262 standard. The
third factor is to be able to create comparable results within the intended framework,
which was theoretically oriented to address important relations among the SaAC
elements. Multiple versions of the TIM were developed and were presented to the
experts in each evaluation session with a highlight on the new changes. The final
factor was specifying the period to use the expert evaluation. This type of data
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collection was assigned to be a formative evaluation. Therefore, it has been carried
out during each stage to evolve with the TIM design [26].
4.2.4 Workshop
The fourth method of data collection was a Workshop used as an approach to ensure
the transparency of analysing proposed solutions in the domain of maintainability of
safety cases. A workshop consist of an arrangement where a group of people learn,
acquire new knowledge, perform creative problem-solving or innovate in relation to
a domain-specific issue [27]. Workshops are arranged events of a limited duration
targeted to participants who share a common domain, e.g., work in the organisa-
tional change domain [28] [29]. In this study this method was utilised to create a
discussion between experts in the relevant areas in order to derive useful insights
into the case company and the possible solutions proposed. The workshop posed as
a form of expert evaluation with additional focus on creating a discussion among
the experts to fill any knowledge gap, to illuminate their differences and similarities
with respect to goals, outcomes, phases, roles, and organisation.
Following the recommendations of Ørngreen and Levinsen [27], the participant
group was kept small in order to allow everyone’s personal attention and the chance
to be heard. The workshop was conducted with the case company and included ten
participants. They were from the E/E and Chassis departments. That summarises
the expertise that is needed to evaluate ideas regarding the way they build and con-
struct their SaACs, while also including the opinions of the experts of the functions
that those safety cases are built to assure.
The workshop topic was a discussion of the literature review of solutions related
to SaAC maintainability, in particular traceability improvements. Based on the
discussions among the attending experts, prioritisation of the solutions connected to
traceability of various artefact information was possible. The scope was narrowed
down to focus on maintenance and modelling traceability information to support
agile change management for the SaACs. Based on the description provided by
Ørngreen and Levinsen [27] of participation modes, the workshop has a collaborative
context whereby researchers and participants work together but with the researchers
in control. As the solutions were pinpointed and discussed based on the related
work application in the literature review, the participants discussions has helped
the researches as observers to choose which approach to follow.
4.2.5 Focus Group
In a focus group, only a small amount of problems are addressed. Questions are
open ended but selected to continuously lead the answers towards the determined
problems. A moderator is chosen as a guide for the group in order to direct the
answers to focus on the topic [30].
For design science research, focus groups are used to elicit feedback from the
participants regarding the utility of the study’s generated design artefact. For the
purpose of evaluating the TIM, a confirmatory focus group was created and con-
ducted. A “confirmatory focus group” is a focus group utilised to evaluate a design
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artefact and its utility in a real world setting in design science research rather than
the “exploratory focus groups” in which the aim is to gather quick feedback for
improving the artefact [31].
The smaller group of participants were chosen in order for all members to
have room to discuss their thoughts and to facilitate the interaction between the
participants. The meeting was held on a video call and therefore a smaller set
of participants was helpful as social queues when someone is about to talk is less
evident and people tend to start talking over each other.
The guidelines on conducting evaluation with focus groups provided by Trem-
blay et al. [31] were adhered to. The authors provide guidelines on how to conduct
focus group evaluation for design research. The first step that was performed was
to formulate the research problem, which was the evaluation of the TIM and its
applicability in an industrial setting at the case company. The reason for the focus
group instead of an expert evaluation in the shape of individual interviews was; since
these people are working with SaAC at the company but with different aspects of it,
in different steps of the process, their collaboration and ideas of how this model will
be utilised by them collaboratively was an important aspect to discuss. Because the
participants had different knowledge about SaAC another reason behind the evalu-
ation and the focus group environment was to allow them to discuss these topics as
well as evaluating the TIM itself. This method also allowed for probing questions
that helped the participants delve deeper into any statement that they made that
were insightful but had the potential to provide more in depth information.
The participants were chosen based on how they relate to the SaAC in their
work and how their roles fit together. The same goes for the questioning route, the
goal of the evaluation was to also focus on the TIM on its own, how it would fit
into their development process and how the different employees would work with it
in their collaboration.
The questions were asked in a specific order according to Tremblay et al. [31]
guidelines. The questions were ordered to start with the most general ones down to
the narrowest but also relative to the importance of the question, asking the most
important ones first. One of the researchers acted as the moderator for the focus
group and the other one as an observer taking notes.
The questions that were asked can be found in Appendix A.14
4.3 Iteration 1
In the first iteration, the primary goals were to lay the foundation of this study
in term of gathering the knowledge from previous research and to find a suitable
method to use in order to introduce traceability to SaACs. Said model also had to
be in line with the case company’s established workflow, structure and practises in
regards to SaACs.
4.3.1 Awareness of Problem
In the Awareness of Problem phase of this iteration a literature review was con-
ducted focusing on traceability in SaACs, traceability in safety assurance evidence
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and maintainability of SaACs. This was done in order to gain a better and deeper
understanding of the problem domain but also of the solutions that have already
been proposed in the area. The majority of papers that were found states the need
for increased traceability within SaACs and between the SaAC and the artefacts
it references. The main obstacle is that the evidence is spread across various loca-
tions and exist in different formats. In the most relevant paper found and reviewed,
there were various different solutions proposed. These solutions were, among oth-
ers, Traceability Information Models, tools, different analysis methods and process
models [12, 18, 9, 32, 16, 33, 34, 14]. These solutions were often tailored to a specific
case, not attempted in industry or only proof of concepts. However, these solutions
were important in order to gain knowledge of possible solution, draw inspiration
from and build upon to fit the real-world scenario. A list and a brief description of
those solution is included in the Appendix, Figure A.17 and Figure A.18.
4.3.2 Suggestion
The previous studies found that proposed relevant solutions to the traceability and
maintainability problem were analysed deeper. The suggestion in this phase com-
prised of a set of existing solutions that could be applicable as a foundation for this
study. In order to develop and evaluate the chosen solutions found, an extensive
presentation was prepared for the relevant experts at the case company. The goal of
the presentation was to get a better understanding of what type of solution would
fit the case company’s need and what would work in the development structure that
they were employing at the time. The suggestion comprised a document and a pre-
sentation containing different methods that could be utilised in order to develop a
solution for the case company. The suggestions would be subject to an evaluation
from experts at the case company in the shape of a workshop where each proposal
was evaluated in terms of the feasibility of implementation in the case company’s
structure and way of working but also on the potential to improve traceability in
SaAC overall.
4.3.3 Development
In order to propose a solution it became evident that the scope needed to be narrowed
down. A document was created summarising all relevant research and solutions in
order to facilitate the presentation creation and to ensure that the key principles
from each solution were understood. The final presentation and the solutions pro-
posed were only related to traceability in SaACs. The presentation/workshop was
held present the findings from the literature review and the analysis of the existing
solutions. The participants of the presentation were industry experts in SaACs,
functional safety, Research and Development (R&D) and ISO 26262 standard and
totalled at a number of ten people. Their roles at the case company were the fol-
lowing: Functional Safety Manager, Senior Principal Functional Safety Engineer,
Principal System design engineer, Specialist Functional Safety, GTM E/E Plat-
form, Lead System Design Engineer, System Architect HW, Acting Manager and
Development engineer (See Appendix, A.16). The solutions which were identified in
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the awareness of problem and suggestion phase were presented in dept in order for
the experts to provide informed and valuable feedback both based on their existing
knowledge in the area but also on their understanding of existing solutions.
4.3.4 Evaluation
The presentation resulted in a large amount of questions and feedback from the
experts in regards to the various solutions. The solutions proposed by Nair et al.
[12] and Taguchi et al. [18] were the main focus of both questions and interest. The
potential for the case company was clearly present in a Traceability Information
Model compared to many of the other solutions. The majority of the experts agreed
that the company had the opportunity and potential to improve the traceability
in their SaACs evidence and documentation by implementing a TIM suited for
their organisation and workflow. The experts did also point out that, in regards
to traceability, many of the other solutions that were presented had potential to
help the development and creation of SaACs. However, it was evident that they did
not have the same applicability in terms of maintainability as the TIM which then
became both the researchers and their main focus of this study.
4.3.5 Conclusion
Based on the result from the evaluation phase with the experts at the case company,
the next step was to make an attempt to build a TIM inspired by Nair et al. [12] and
Taguchi et al. [18] TIMs and findings. Combining the two solutions with the data
elicited from the safety case template and instructions, workshops and meetings at
the case company enough information was gathered in order to start designing the
TIM. The model had to be tailored to the case company which meant work would
have to be closely conducted with the experts available at the company in order
to understand their processes and tools that were utilised to store the information
needed to build a safety case.
In regards to the research questions, finding an appropriate method to develop
a solution indicated the path to answer RQ.1.1.
4.3.6 Artefact evolution - Iteration 1
The decision to create a Traceability Information Model was made. The decision
was based on the study of existing research in traceability for SaACs along with the
evaluation from the experts in SaACs and functional safety at the case company.
A TIM was chosen for its potential to benefit the company and to contribute to
identify the relationships among artefacts and elements which will in turn contribute
to improve maintainability in SaACs.
After pinpointing what type of solution that this study would attempt to
produce together with the experts at the case company, two solutions were identified,
in particular the two that was utilised as a starting point to begin building the TIM
upon. Changes would have to be made in order to fit the needs of the case company,
the ISO 26262 standard and the automotive products that the model would be
created for. While these solutions have been implemented in an industrial setting,
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both TIMs were applied on SaACs related to railway and not automotive systems.
The two TIMs that were utilised as a starting point were developed by Nair et al.
[12] and Taguchi et al. [18]. These TIMs were created as class diagrams which would
facilitate the visualisation of relationships between the artefacts (ISO 26262 work
products) and elements that are present in the SaACs and provide a clear overview
of the case. Together with SaACs and functional safety experts at the case company
an attempt was made to build upon existing solutions and augment these it to suit
the case company’s needs and facilitate the need to address the ISO 26262 standard.
4.4 Iteration 2
In the second iteration the first goal was to draw inspiration from and tailor the
TIMs developed by Nair et al. [12] and Taguchi et al. [18] to create a TIM suited
for the case company. This TIM would also be based on the conclusions of the first
iteration and evaluated against the old traceability strategies employed by the case
company.
4.4.1 Awareness of Problem
During this phase of the cycle various documents provided by the case company
were analysed. Two of these documents were a template and a set of instructions on
how to build a SaAC so that it reference work products needed to comply with the
ISO 26262 standard on functional safety. These documents are used internally for
the developers and safety assurance experts who create and maintain the SaACs in
order to ensure that all relevant and required pieces of evidence are present in the
SaAC. This helped identify the artefacts and elements that are required or could be
used to provide evidence for the safety case.
The case company also provided a SaAC which they were developing at the
time of this study. The case was analysed in order to obtain a better understanding
of what a developed SaAC looks like, is structured and if there was information of
where all relevant documents could be found in their various systems and repos-
itories. The studied SaAC provided by the case company was incomplete in the
sense that it only covered parts of the overall argumentation structure. The SaAC
provided was built after the development of the function was complete which is not
the process that the case company will utilise to create and maintain future SaACs
nor the most efficient way to develop a SaAC [14]. Once their process and structure
for building safety cases is better established within the company, the SaACs will
be developed in parallel to the development of the safety critical function the case
will relate to. What was required was the existence of some elements and artefact
that relate to each other. In conclusion, the results of the study was not negatively
affected by the state of the SaAC provided. However, this was kept in mind when
performing the final evaluation of the case company’s practises and to further miti-
gate the implications of the issues regarding the incomplete SaAC. The decision was
made to rely more heavily on the template and instructions that summarised what
information and evidence was needed to create a complete SaAC in order to propose
solutions for the identified problems.
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In the ISO 26262 functional safety standard, a hierarchy of claim and argu-
ments are established in order to reason that the system is safe. This hierarchy is
correlated to the safety goals, which are then broken down into functional safety
requirements, which are in turn broken down into technical safety requirements.
The technical safety requirements are then finally broken down into hardware and
software requirements [8]. However, during this phase insights were gained into the
main issues the case company faced in regards to traceability in their SaAC process.
As mentioned above, functional safety requirements are broken down to technical
safety requirements. The problem arise when, more often than not, one safety crit-
ical function can have multiple technical requirements that are broken down into
further technical requirements and this can be done multiple times for each new
technical requirements creating additional levels in the hierarchy. A pressing chal-
lenge is adhering to the traceability between these levels of requirements and their
respective evidence. Another obstacle faced by the case company is the vast amount
of documents and information spread across various tools and in different formats
which is a problem that was also identified by Nair et al. while evaluating their TIM
[12].
4.4.2 Suggestion
While analysing the SaAC provided by the case company an attempt was made to
trace the information back to its source to evaluate the current level of traceability in
their SaAC. This exercise also helped investigate what information the case company
needed to be traceable and to keep this in mind while attempting to create possible
solutions on how to solve the issues. Alongside the knowledge gathered from the
literature review and the data provided by the case company the shaping of the
TIM could begin, focusing on solving the existing traceability issues. The company
did not utilise TIMs in any aspect of their development process and the concept
was new to the majority of employees the researchers came in contact with. Which
could have been valuable information since the SaAC related TIMs we identified
were created like any other TIM. Therefore, there was no knowledge about TIMs
and how to develop or work with them available at the case company to elicit any
insights from.
The foundation of the solution is derived from previous work in the area.
Especially previous studies in which the authors have created and utilised a TIM
which laid the foundation for this study [12, 18]. The TIMs were studied closely
in order to completely understand the terminology used and the argument behind
choosing the classes or artefacts. A first attempt was made to create a safety related
TIM that could suit the case company based on the data gathered from the company
as well as from existing studies. Together with the case company an attempt was
made to combine previous work with their needs regarding their SaACs creation and
maintenance while also complying with the ISO 26262 standard and the automotive
industry.
It was found that Nair. et al. [12] TIM is most similar to the solution to the
case company’s needs. However, an important aspect of Taguchi et al.[18] paper is
the trace link created to the requirements involved as was identified as a key issue
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in the Awareness of Problem phase of this iteration. This was not considered in [12]
TIM. The case company has expressed the importance of all SaACs to be related
to at least one safety requirement and therefore the trace links to the requirements
is vitally important for the proposed TIM. Taguchi et al. [18] also include the ac-
ceptance criteria, plan and measurements in their TIM which is not available in
Nair et al. [12] TIM. Based on the knowledge that was accumulated the assump-
tion was made that these three would be important to establish if a safety case is
complete and therefore included them in this study’s version. It was assumed that
these classes could be useful, not only because it could introduce important trace-
ability information but also because it could help the case company to improve their
structure and process working with safety cases.
The suggestion for this iteration boiled down to using Nair. et al. [12] TIM as
an inspiration to develop a TIM tailored to the case company and to include some
elements of Taguchi et al.[18] TIM.
4.4.3 Development
Two iterations of developing and evaluating the TIM were performed with the ex-
perts at the case company. 4.1 displays the nested phase within the DSR method-
ology to express the process that was performed.
Awareness 
of problem
Suggestion
Evaluation
Conclusion
Development
Development
Development
Evaluation
Figure 4.1: Nested development phase, DSR process
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The nested development and evaluation phases was done in order to create a
quicker feedback loop, still within the context of the same problem for the itera-
tion. Since the problem space was the same, this structure was created rather than
conducting a new iteration for each development/evaluation phase.
An attempt was made in order to create the first version of the TIM for the case
company. Data was gathered from the documents provided by the case company of
their SaACs process and instructions. Additional data was elicited from participant
observations conducted in various meetings where the workflow and steps in the
safety process for an “end user function" were discussed. Combining the two sources
of data, the first version of the TIM emerged (See Appendix, A.1).
4.4.4 Evaluation
The TIM that was chosen for evaluation in this cycle (See Appendix, A.1) displays
the suggestion that emerged from combining the knowledge acquired from the pre-
vious studies conducted in regards to creating TIM for safety cases and the issues
which were identified at the case company.
A meeting was held with the people responsible for functional safety and safety
cases at the case company (See Appendix, A.16) in order to conduct an expert
evaluation and to determine what changes that needed to be made in order for the
TIM to better suit their needs and on what abstraction level the TIM should be
represented at. The abstraction level of Nair et al. [12] TIM is on a high level,
providing an overview of how all pieces of the safety case is related. Compared
to dividing the evidence into different types like Agrawal et al. [9] who has, for
example, divided the evidence into Acceptance test, Code and tests, simulation and
others. Since SaACs can be enormous in size, the initial assumptions were that the
level of granularity would contribute greatly to the size and complexity of the TIM.
This was confirmed by the experts at the case company who expressed that the
showcased TIM was too granular even though it was developed on an abstraction
level similar to Nair et al. [12].
A.2 in the Appendix displays the updated TIM after the first round of evalua-
tion with the functional safety, SaACs and ISO 26262 experts at the case company.
In the second iteration of the evaluation phase, the experts (See Appendix,
A.16) explained their process of working with safety plans. At the case company
they utilise the safety plan to define activities which in turn will be performed using
appropriate techniques that will result in the artefacts. Finally, the proposed TIM
included the classes Acceptance Plan, Acceptance Process and Acceptance criteria
based on Agrawal et al. [9] TIM to enable trace links back to the tolerable risk that
is allowed for the end user function. This however, was deemed to granular and
too complex for the experts that expressed that it would not provide value for the
SaACs or the creation of it.
A.3 in the Appendix displays the updated TIM after the second round of
evaluation with the functional safety, SaACs and ISO 26262 experts at the case
company.
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4.4.5 Conclusion
Based on the expert evaluation it’s arguable that the results could be used as a start-
ing point to identify the relationships between the artefacts and elements present in
the SaACs developed by the case company. By introducing the class storage location
it will also be possible to keep track of evidence regardless if the evidence is stored
across different tools.
4.4.6 Artefact evolution - Iteration 2
In the initial version of the TIM (see Appendix, A.1) the main differences from
Nair et al. [12] solution was that in the case company, the “project" class is not
applicable in their case as all SaACs stems from an ’end user function’. A product
comprise of a multitude of end user functions but a SaAC never covered more than
one of these functions and the need to trace the evidence all the way back to the
product was questioned but not immediately dismissed. The proposed changes in
the TIM included a ’end user function’ as a class related to the artefact and to a
product type that would be the topmost traceable unit to adhere to. From Taguchi
et al. [18] solution the main inspiration was from their focus on the processes
related to SaACs and while identifying which processes were utilised at the case
company Acceptance criteria, process and plan were added. With the knowledge
gained from the data elicitation through participant observation, document analysis
and the literature review it seemed like the best method was to initially create an
inclusive solution and remove from there in order to utilise the maximum amount of
existing solutions. This meaning, the initial TIM included many classes that would
presumably be removed or edited in order to narrow down the TIM in the attempt to
make it appropriate for the case company. This was done since the existing solutions
had already been tested and verified and therefore thought it better to evaluate with
the experts at the case company to determine the importance to traceability rather
than ourselves.
The second version of the TIM (see Appendix, A.2) emerged based on the
result from the first expert evaluation session. As mentioned above, according to
Birch et al. [8] safety assurance is comprised of a hierarchy where safety goals
are the topmost level, followed by the different types of requirements. At the case
company they adhere to the same practise since it is a cornerstone of working with
the ISO 26262 standard [8]. Therefore, the representation of safety goals and safety
requirement specification in the TIM became a main focus. The “product" class
was removed in the second evaluation round as the importance in terms of evidence
traceability was equivocal. Each SaAC is created based on an end user function
which is the element that encapsulates the entire SaAC. Meaning, the SaAC is build
for a particular end user function and evidence is provided in order to argue for
the safety of that function. Therefore, the “product" class was changed to “end
user function" to correlate to the case company’s traceability structure of the SaAC.
Additionally, multiple products at the case company might utilise the same end user
function, making the linking to the product even less important.
The third version of the TIM (see Appendix, A.3) was further developed based
on the result of the second round of expert evaluation. Granularity was a significant
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issue expressed during expert evaluation in iteration 2 which led to the removal of
the acceptance process, plan and criteria which were deemed unsubstantial to the
traceability of a SaAC and out of scope for the TIM. The experts expressed that
although the acceptance process is important to validate the safety of the product, no
direct links are needed in order to maintain a safety case in relation to its evidence.
As mentioned in section 1, one obstacle in creating traceability in SaACs is
that artefacts are spread out over different locations [12]. In the third version of
the model, a solution is proposed by adding a class called “Storage location" that
is connected to the artefact (see Appendix, A.3). This class will specify in which
system the artefact can be found as well as where in said system it can be located.
By introducing the class “storage location" it will also be possible to keep track of
evidence regardless if the evidence is stored across different tools.
An additional change that was made was the indirect connection between
safety requirement specification and both claims and evidence. As discussed in the
awareness of problem phase in iteration 2, the traceability between evidence and
requirements can become very complex and convoluted. Therefore, it was shown
that the link between the safety requirement specifications to both the claim and
evidence is vital for establishing traceability.
One complication that was expressed in the expert evaluation of the TIM was
that Safety requirement can be connected to an artefact in a very vague way but can
also be the artefact itself. This creates a confusion in the TIM on how to address
the trace links to Safety requirements so it can be generalised. This was solved by
connecting the safety requirement specification class indirectly to both the claim
and the evidence in the TIM.
4.5 Iteration 3
In the third and final iteration of the study the focused was on improving the TIM
that emerged from the previous iteration while also making an attempt to generalise
the findings.
4.5.1 Awareness of Problem
In addition to the insights gathered from the previous iteration on how to improve
on the TIM, finding existing SaAC from other organisations in order to generalise
the findings and the TIM was realised.
4.5.2 Suggestion
In order to generalise the TIM it was needed to apply the solution on other SaACs
and implement those changes as a result from this iteration. The goal was to cre-
ate something general within the space for automotive, but also looked at outside
resources to get inspired. It is something the researchers learned by sitting at the
case company, they look at other domains to see how different industries solve the
same or similar problems.
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To do so, the researchers went online to look for existing, open source, SaACs
that could be utilised in order to gain additional insights in how to improve and
generalise the TIM.
The following search terms were used on Google scholar:
• Automotive safety case
• Safety assurance case in automotive
• Safety assurance case
• UAV Safety assurance case
• Railway Safety assurance case
• Safety assurance case example
• Safety case example
• Example data safety assurance cases
• Sample safety assurance cases
• GSN safety assurance cases
Although the amount of appropriate results were relatively scarce and the final
selection of SaAC was five additional SaAC. The selection criteria on which cases to
include or exclude the SaACs that were found from the search were the following:
Size and complexity: The size and complexity was a plausible indication on
if the SaAC was a made up example or based on a real world example. A larger
and more complex case would have a higher possibility to be a real world example
rather than an example used to prove a point. This metric alone would of course
not be enough to validate the relevance of the case but was a determining factor.
Larger and more complex cases would also help validate one of the greatest issues
in SaACs maintenance and could, in that regard, help determine if the TIM has the
possibility to be useful in such an industrial setting.
Level coverage, existence of a context for the safety case: Level cover-
age was determined based on if the SaAC includes all the different components of
a safety case. These components being claims, arguments and evidence. The lack
of existing evidence, compared to the other two components, was noted but not
excluded. The lack of evidence in these cases found online was suspected as the
companies or organisations would not be expected to share that level of confidential
information. These cases was, however, still utilised to validate and evaluate the
other aspects of the TIM since the structure and other elements were still available.
Covering Evidence relationship: An interesting aspect that was learned from
the evaluation at the case company in the previous iteration was the relationship
between pieces of evidence and their relationship to safety requirements, which was
one of the main issues the company faced in regards to traceability. It was important
to find other occurrences regarding the evidence relationship in order to see how and
if other solutions attempted to solve this problem.
Source credibility: Another aspect that was evaluated was who made the cases
and what company created them. An investigation was conducted into the organ-
isations who created the cases when the name was not recognised. Ensuring that
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only trustworthy cases were included in the evaluation of the TIM was important.
Relevance to Safety: A a couple of assurance cases were found that were im-
plemented for security and the relevance to safety was negligible. These cases were
excluded in order to keep the TIM safety related since some aspect of these two areas
differ and it is outside of the scope of this thesis to create a TIM that is generalised
to that extent.
Automotive relevance: An attempt was made to find SaACs relevant to the
automotive industry but since the main focus was to identify cases that were safety
related the industry the cases were utilised in was not an excluding factor.
4.5.3 Development
The result of the search yielded in five additional SaACs [35] [2] [34] [15] [36] apart
from the case company’s case. All six SaACs were analysed in order to identify the
elements and artefacts available or not in relation to the TIM. The addition of a
“context” were present in multiple SaACs that was not considered before. Several
of the cases had a context in terms of Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)
that were connected both to the top claim, claims and arguments. ASIL is an
important aspect of the ISO 26262 standard [5] and could have a positive impact
on the traceability of SaACs.
A spreadsheet of available elements in the SaACs was created in order to
visualise frequent available classes to determine how often each class is referenced in
a typical SaAC. The availability of each class in the SaACs are visualised as a bar
chart (See Appendix, A.13).
Three SaACs, were selected as candidates for applying the TIM (See Appendix,
A.5-A.7) [34] .
The steps taken in order to apply the TIM on the SaACs were as follows:
• Identify which ISO work product/artefact the Safety case was attempting to
produce
• Start modelling the relationships between the different GSN specific classes
(Argument, Claim, Evidence, Top claim/Goal and Context)
• Analyse the content of the GSN specific classes to identify important trace-
able information that relates to the development process classes. E.g., Activ-
ity, technique, storage location, artefact provenance and relationship, analysis
document and version.
• Draw the associations between these classes and the GSN specific ones
• Identify the End user function or any pointers towards a product or similar.
• Note down which classes in the TIM were missing/not available
Applying the TIM on the case company’s SaAC (See Appendix, A.5) was done not
only to evaluate the TIMs applicability but also to aid the evaluation of the TIM
for the experts at the case company with whom the final evaluation was conducted.
In this visualisation, the scale and complexity that begin to emerge when SaACs
become large and complex becomes increasingly visible.
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4.5.4 Evaluation
When the data was collected from applying the TIM on the various SaACs, iden-
tification of which classes in the TIM were rarely or never present could be done
(See Appendix, A.13) , the existence of additional classes that were not available
in the TIM and other relevant insights that were important aspects of evaluating
the model. The classes, or reference to classes, which were found missing from the
SaACs were all related to the development process. Information about the develop-
ment process of companies is often sensitive information or might not be explicitly
referenced in the SaAC. To mitigate this gap existing literature was explored in
order to provide argumentation for if the missing classes should be kept or removed
from the TIM in relevance to establishing traceability in SaACs, more information
about this is available in the results section 5.1.2.1. The classes that were available
in the SaACs and were already represented in the TIM was decided to be evaluate in
terms of the importance for improving traceability. The fourth version of the TIM
(See Appendix, A.4) emerged from the analysis of the SaACs, applying the TIM to
the cases and the result from the extended literature review regarding each class and
its relation to traceability, especially the classes related to the development process.
In addition to the evaluation based on existing cases and the extended litera-
ture review, a focus group evaluation was conducted. In preparation for this focus
group, an abstract view of the artefact class in the TIM was created. The TIM was
also divided into two parts, one including the development process elements and
the other one containing the safety case structure elements. This was done in order
to facilitate the understanding of the TIM and its element in depth and to help
the experts better understand what artefacts and processes are encapsulated by the
model.
The focus group was conducted with four experts at the case company with
different areas of expertise in regards to SaAC. One was a Specialist in functional
safety another one a safety case manager, the third one Principal system design
engineer and functional safety specialist and the last one had the role of Senior
principal functional safety engineer (See Appendix, A.15). The questions that were
asked in the focus group related to the TIMs applicability in an industrial setting,
the challenges that the practitioners foresaw, the understandability and accuracy of
the model, how the TIM could be augmented to further facilitate the integration to
their organisation and the current support that the company has for creating the
necessary links to utilise the model (See Appendix, A.14).
Based on their feedback, a final version of the TIM emerged (See Appendix,
A.8).
4.5.5 Conclusion
By conducting the focus group, applying the TIM on the existing SaACs and
analysing the results with relevance to previous studies in safety assurance, trace-
ability and ISO 26262 a final version of the TIM was produced. Since multiple
SaACs were utilised, created by different organisations, it can be assumed that the
developed TIM is more generic than only suitable for the case company.
The focus group resulted in some proposed changes to the TIM which were
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implemented in the fifth version of the model (See Appendix, A.8). Furthermore,
positive discussions emerged on what work could be conducted at the case company
in order to improve their current way of working by implementing the TIM.
Additionally, with help from existing literature and the findings during this
study, a list of recommendations was produced for participants who want to utilise
a TIM in order to improve the traceability of their SaACs.
These methods of evaluation provided insights into RQ.1.2 that bridged the
knowledge gap that was left from completing the second iteration. The research
question could now be answered based on the outcome of this iteration.
4.5.6 Artefact Evolution - Iteration 3
The fourth version of the TIM (see Appendix, A.5) was created based on analysing
the six different SaAC, including the company’s SaAC, that were searched for and
found online in order to identify which classes were directly or indirectly available
in these SaACs. Directly meaning the SaAC structure elements (Claim, Argument,
Evidence etc.) and indirectly meaning the development process elements (Storage
location, version, participant, activity etc.). After analysing all six cases, the classes
that were represented in the SaACs and which were not were identified (See Ap-
pendix, A.13). Additionally, the identification of one reoccurring element in the
cases that were not available in the TIM was made. This class was context, which
was related to the claim and the argument. Based on the varying results from
analysing the six cases, the importance of traceability of each and every class in-
cluded in the TIM was ensured. The search into existing literature was extended in
regards to traceability in SaAC and its evidence. The following section includes ar-
gumentation for keeping or removing classes from the TIM based on their relevance
to traceability based on existing literature. Both types of classes were evaluated,
the ones that were available and the ones that were missing, since their availability
does not directly correlate to the traceability of the element. The argumentation is
available in the results section 5.1.2.1.
Analysing the cases showed which classes in the TIM were most important
based on their availability (See Appendix, A.13) and their importance to traceability
found in existing studies (See Appendix, A.13). This led to the examination and
investigation of further regarding their relevance to traceability which, If not correct,
would decrease the quality of the TIM.
An additional activity that was performed, in order to create the fourth version
of the TIM, consisted of applying the TIM to three different SaACs (One of those
being the case company’s SaAC). This was done in order to mitigate the problem
of the case company’s SaAC being incomplete but also to make an attempt to
generalise the TIM to fit other projects. This helped to evaluate the TIMs classes,
relationships and associations in comparison with other SaACs.
One of the SaAC that was picked to apply the TIM to was the Ubers SaAC
for their self-driving vehicles [2] (See Appendix, A.7). This case was picked not only
because its level of detail but also since it is a real-world case that the company has
published as an open source document on their website. Additionally, another ben-
efit of using this case was that the SaAC is developed for the automotive industry.
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The case comprised of five top claims or safety goals that divided the case in to five
different parts. In order to keep the model of the SaAC readable it was decided that
the TIM would only be applied on one of these goals. In this case it showed similari-
ties between the implementation of case company’s SaAC and Ubers SaAC. In both
these cases they have adjusted the artefact to fit the company’s need and which then
represented an ISO 26262 work product instead of consisting of one. In the appli-
cation of this case, it contained the existence of multiple techniques combined in to
one activity. Additionally, the existence of multiple “EvidenceProvenance" elements
linked to one piece of evidence was found in the SaAC.
The other SaAC that the TIM was applied to was an automatically generated
SaAC developed by Denney et al. at NASA [35] (See Appendix, A.6). It is a SaAC
that is made from “automatically generated instance arguments" [35]. The case
was developed for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAS). No other open source SaAC
was found that was related to the automotive industry. However, this case is for
another type of vehicle and therefore has many of the same characteristics as both
of the automotive cases. Even though the ISO 26262 standard is only for “Roadside
vehicles“ [5], there are similar standards for UAS. The case was also created using
the GSN structure and included the same elements as the automotive cases. The
same thing was found in this case as with the Uber case, which is that multiple
techniques can together be used to perform one activity. An additional insight from
applying the TIM to this SaAC was that multiple activities can be utilised to create
one artefact.
Applying the TIM on the case company’s SaAC (See Appendix, A.5), it was
found that the previous assumption that a Safety requirements specification did not
always relate to a claim to be false. The safety requirement specification was in
all three cases connected to at least one claim. Artefact provenance, that describes
the characteristics that relates to the information of the life-cycle and management
responsibility of the artefact was only available in one of the three cases that the TIM
was applied to. Meaning the association assuming that the artefact was associated
with one Artefact provenance was incorrect and was subsequently updated to a
zero-to-many relationship.
Applying the TIM to the three SaACs did provide with further insight into the
associations and relationships rather than more information regarding the available
classes. With just the three cases that the TIM was applied to, much of the same
patterns were seen in terms of the relationships and associations. The other two
SaAC were chosen from the available five based on their level of detail. The most
detailed options were picked, including as many links and elements as possible.
For the final evaluation and augmentation of the TIM a focus group was con-
ducted with experts at the case company. The results from the focus group evalu-
ation that was conducted as the final evaluation of this study were very insightful.
The questions and subsequently, the answers covered discussions regarding the ap-
plicability and quality of the TIM.
The experts expressed that the model should include more annotations, the
model classes needs a more detailed description in order for everyone to understand
the purpose of each class. This will enable a wider range of users to read and
understand the TIM. A few of the participants expressed that once the classes were
29
4. Methods
explained to them, it made a lot more sense. The model abstraction, dividing the
classes into SaAC structural classes and development process classes was deemed
helpful and increased their understanding of the model and they could more easily
map the classes to the real-world components. The associations between the classes
were discussed. The relationships between classes were deemed accurate as far as
they were concerned but they did however, suggest a few changes to the associations.
One of these suggestions was that the argument aggregates a claim, or that the
argument is owned by the claim. Another observation made by the experts that
was discussed in detail in the focus group was the relationship between the claim
and any development process class that was missing in the TIM. This feedback was
used to create the final version of the TIM.
The changes made between each TIM is listed in Appendix A.0.2
4.6 Threats to Validity
To discuss the threats to validity in this study, the threats to validity that Runeson
and Host [37] has identified were utilised. The types of threats are: Construct
validity, Internal validity, External validity and Reliability.
4.6.1 Construct Validity
In order to ensure that all participants in this study were fully aware of the aim of
the study and what, in the evaluation phases, was being evaluated. All employees
that contributed or took part in the expert evaluations or workshops had previous
knowledge in SaAC or worked in the team the researchers of this study were assigned
to at the company. At the beginning of each meeting, evaluation or workshop with
any of the employees a short introductory presentation was held in order to ensure
everybody understood the purpose of the activity, what the goal with it was and
what information was desired to extract from it. Any questions that arose were
always addressed immediately so that any uncertainty was not carried through the
entire meeting but rather clarified directly so that the participant could continue
the meeting with a clearer picture of the situation and better understand the study
and the purpose.
When conducting participant observations, there is a possibility of misunder-
standing and forgetting information. This was mitigated by always having both
researchers on site during these sessions. Note taking could therefore be delegated
to one of the researchers while letting the other one focus solely on observing the
scenario and interactions that took place. After each session, the researchers sat
down together to expand on the notes that were taken during the observation (See
Appendix, A.9-A.12), added more data that was overlooked or missed and filled
in information based on the available notes. This method was useful not only to
remember and understand the session better at a later date but also enabled the ex-
amination and analysis of the data while discussing and expanding the information.
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4.6.2 Internal Validity
Due to time constraints and the long process for each new product at the case
company, this study will be unable to cover the utilisation of the solution on a
product within the company during the designated time period. Although the results
will undergo expert evaluation in order to measure the success of the findings, the
remaining work after this study is to apply the findings in an actual project to ensure
that the desired outcome is achieved. The artefact did go through multiple rounds of
expert evaluation and in addition, existing studies were investigated in traceability
in relation to SaAC in order to evaluate the appropriateness of the model that was
created.
As mentioned, the generated solution will not be utilised during the study on
a project at the case company. The solution should be applied continuously during
the development of a product and knowledge regarding how to utilise a TIM is vital
for the employees at the company in order to reap the possible benefits. Therefore,
guidelines were provided on how to work with a TIM in order to achieve substantial
results. The recommendations available on how to increase traceability is further
guidance and help in order for the case company to implement the TIM in their
daily business.
There is a risk that during the first iteration, additional relevant studies were
not found in the search. Due to the time constraint on this study, only recent papers
(from max ten years back) were investigated in order to build a case that is up to
date. Older studies were looked into but not as thoroughly. Important research
might have been missed because of the targeted focus. For future research in this
area, an extensive literature review is recommended and should be performed.
Selection of the participants, especially in the evaluation activities, was done
with the aid from the company supervisor assigned to this study. There is a risk that
the participants, even though possessing relevant roles in the company, might have
been picked based on their availability and therefore not entirely without bias. An
attempt was made to include existing literature and SaAC as a means to evaluate
the TIM from outside sources. However, to fully mitigate this, further research in
this area should look into including experts from multiple organisations.
4.6.3 External Validity
An attempt was made to generalise the results. However, since this thesis was
limited to one company it may be that the results will be specific to the case. The
results will be connected to the systems and structures used at the company at
hand. In order to mitigate this and make the results and findings more generalised,
the decision was made to evaluate and apply the generated solution on other Safety
Assurance Cases available online and in other existing studies. The results will be
tailored to the automotive industry but applying and modifying the model based on
other SaAC will augment the TIM from being limited to the structures and systems
of the case company.
Additionally, the unique aspects of other industries in terms of SaACs has
not been fully explored in this study because the external SaACs analysed and the
case company are mainly from the automotive industry. Although the results were
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aimed to be generalised, future studies should attempt to analyse and include other
industries in order to further generalise the results.
4.6.4 Reliability
Since the authors of this study had no previous knowledge about the case company’s
practises, a significant amount of time was spent on identifying those practises and
instructions. The process of data elicitation and analysis took a significant portion of
the available time for this study. This also meant that some focus of the evaluation
phases became dedicated to further explanation from the experts in how the process
of working with SaAC, the ISO 26262 standard and general practises were conducted
at the company. This did not suppress the evaluation of the TIM but did extend
the time of the evaluation. Other researchers who wants to make an attempt to
reproduce this study could possibly spend less time in this step if they are already
familiar with the company that would serve as their case company and has all the
appropriate access to data at the very beginning of the study.
4.7 Ethical considerations
In terms of the ethical considerations in this study the guidelines specified in An-
drews and Pradhans paper [38] “Ethical issues in empirical software engineering:
the limits of policy“ was adhered to.
In order to conduct the study with the case company, all information that
will be relevant to the study should be revealed to the researchers. In order for
the company to provide this information, a non-disclosure agreement was signed to
create the boundaries for revealing information in the report and for the company
to protect sensitive information regarding its organisation and procedures. In order
to facilitate the adherence to this agreement, a company supervisor was assigned
to the project and continuous progress reports were held to both the academic and
company supervisors on a bi-weekly schedule. In terms of publishing the report and
the findings in it, the report was presented to the company for approval and for
communicating what information was needed to be anonymous or excluded in the
published report.
All participants of the workshops, expert evaluation, participant observations
and focus group were employed by the case company. In terms of ethical consent, all
information gathered in these sessions were orally approved for use in the report by
the participants. Additionally, while making sure all data regarding the participants
were anonymous the employees got a chance to review the study and the information
presented in order to give them an additional chance to approve the information to
be published.
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Final Results
5.1 Traceability Information Model
A TIM was applied to support SaAC traceability in order to describe the relations
among all artefacts that construct and specify the functional SaAC. The TIM is
also used to documents reference links to the development process elements that
are required for maintaining a SaAC. The purpose of this approach is to create
a fundamental method in order to establish traceability among the artefacts in a
system. Integrating the TIM could provide improvements in the maintenance of
SaAC by implementing trace links.
The TIM has evolved through five versions, by which multiple evaluation meth-
ods have been conducted in order to improve the model. Experts working with SaAC
were involved throughout the entire study. The final model is showcased in three
different abstraction levels in order to provide a more descriptive concept of the TIM
and present the reader with more in dept information of the model and its context.
Based on the experts recommendations, this model could be used by various stake-
holders within the company, where their interest and fields of experience vary.
TIM Abstract View Model
The top level abstraction was a way of divide the TIM elements into two blocks:
Safety Case Structure Elements (SCSE) and Development Related Elements (DRE).
This view concentrates on the general associations between the two categories and
it provides an understanding of how SaAC elements are related to the development
process elements, in the context of supporting the SaAC. The list of associations
and their logical direction is presented in Figure 5.1: they provide an indication of
nature of actions triggered from the DRE side regarding creating a new element
or updating one in the SCSE side, while it is a referencing nature the other way
around.
Safety Case Structure 
Elements
Development Related
Elements
Trigger Action
(creation/update)
References
Figure 5.1: Final Result - TIM Abstract View
The next level of abstraction focuses on each block in a more detailed and
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independent view.
5.1.1 Detailed View - Safety Case Structure Element (SCSE)
The detailed view of the SCSE visualises the traceability among the safety case
elements and can be seen in Figure 5.2. The classes in the diagram represent the
structure of a GSN [15] SaAC, they are represented because they are the main build-
ing blocks of a SaAC. These elements includes; Top claim, Claim, Argument, Piece
of evidence and Context. Additional classes were added in order to provide bet-
ter information regarding traceability, including; Evidence Provenance and Analysis
Document. The associations towards the artefact class and in between classes are
defined in Figure 5.2, the diagram is also provided with a colour map that shows
the origin of each class.
The definition of the classes in the detailed view are defined as follows:
Claim: A statement that is defended within argument, where the assessment of
this statement could end up true or false.
Top Claim: This class is inheriting the claim class in order to represent the Top-
Claim type of claims, this class is used to show a complete structure of the safety
case structure.
Sub-Claim: This class is inheriting the claim class in order to represent the Sub-
Claim type of claims, this class is used to show a complete structure of the safety
case structure.
Argument: A description of information that includes an argumentation with the
intention of supporting a claim.
Piece Of Evidence: A reference to presenting an evidence to support a claim
or an argument.
Context: Present an assumption about the system and working environment.
Evidence Provenance: Provide the history information about an evidence in
regards of its provenance and how it was congregated.
Analysis Document: A document that relates to a Claim in order to contex-
tualise it. It’s the type of supporting documents that are needed to be referenced in
association to an artefact to give a complete trace information to the situation. an
example is a simulation result document. Information in the Analysis Document is
however often used as evidence.
Classes that was inspired by Nair et al. [12] and Taguchi et al. [18] are claim,
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TIM  Zoom View for the 
ٍSafety Case Structure Elements 
Development Related
Elements
Claim
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
a proposition statement
about the system 
Refers
1..*
0..*
Supports
0..* 0..*
refers
0..*
0..*
Reference
1..*
0..*
PieceOfEvidence
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
Objective artefact being
offered in support of one
 or more claims
EvidenceProvenance
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
Used to build a repository of
 evidence that communicates
its provenance and how
 it was gathered
Characterizes 
1..*
0..*
Argument
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
information presented to 
establish claims 
Context
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
involves assumptions made
about the system and its
 environment
Creates
/
Updates
Characterizes Allocates
Analysis Document
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
Simulation results ,
(supporting documents)
Sub-Claim
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
A child class of the main
class (Claim).represent
 sub-claim structure
Artefact
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: Status-type
location: String
Description :
ISO 26262  Work product
Top Claim
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
A child class of the main 
class (Claim).represent
 Top-claim structure
1
1
References
1..*
0..*
refrence
0..*
0..*
Refrences
1..* 1..* 1..*
1..*
1..*
Supports
Relates
Text
Color Map
 safety cases GSN definition
Nair et al.[12] and Taguchi et al.
[18]
TIM Evolution evaluation  
Figure 5.2: Final Result - TIM SCSE View
argument, piece of evidence and evidence provenance. The associations between
classes were altered as a substantial part of the TIM evolution. Additionally, the
context, analysis document and the safety requirement specification classes were
added to support the model’s ability to capture trace-link information needed for
SaAC maintainability.
5.1.2 Detailed View - Development Related Elements (DRE):
The detailed view of the DRE elements provides traceability information among
development elements referenced by the SaAC artefact and can be viewed in Figure
5.3. These classes are; Participant, Storage location, Artefact Provenance, End user
function, Activity and Technique. the associations towards the artefact class and in
between classes are defined in Figure 5.3, the diagram is also provided with a colour
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map that shows the origin of each class.
TIM  Zoom View for the 
ٍDevelopment Related Elements 
Safety Case Structure 
Elements
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responsible
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0..*
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1
0..*
0..*
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1
1..*
Relates to 
Supports
input to
0..*
0..*
Artefact
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: Status-type
location: String
Version; number
Description :
ISO 26262  Work product
ArtefactProvenance
ID: String
name: String
description: String
timeStamp: Date
Description :
Characteristics that relate to
information regarding the
lifecycle and management
responsibility
Storage Location
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: StatusType
location: String
Description :
A particular form of an
artefact differing in certain
 respects from an
earlier form or other forms
Participant
ID: String
name: String
description: String
role: String
phone: String
email: String
Description :
Individual or team in charge
of an artefact or a piece of
evidence
End User Function 
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
a function that needs to be
introduced with the product
Activity
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
like hazard analysis activity 
unit of work that produces
 or modifies an artifacts
Technique:
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
how to perform the activity
to create the artifact 
Colour Map
 safety cases GSN definition
Nair et al.[12] and Taguchi et al.
[18]
TIM Evolution evaluation  
Figure 5.3: Final Result -TIM DRE View
The definition of the classes in the detailed view are defined as follows::
Participant: Used to specify parties who are responsible of creating and man-
aging an artefact or an artefact asset.
Storage Location: Indicated where a certain file or document can be located
across multiple applications.
Artefact Provenance: Provides historical information about the artefact prove-
nance regarding how it was created and managed during its life cycle.
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End User Function: The feature or function that the SaAC evidence is collected
in order to argue that it is safe.
Activity: Units of actions that affect the artefacts or an artefact assets, in terms
of creation or management changes.
Technique: Provides a procedure description on how an activity affecting an arte-
fact is performed.
The Participant, Artefact Provenance, Activity and Technique were inspired
by both Nair et al. [12] and Taguchi et al. [18] papers. The different approaches
employed in using those classes were based on multiple rounds of expert evaluation.
The associations were augmented in order to support traceability in regards to the
artefact. The motivation for these changes is discussed in section 4 in this report.
Adding the End User Function class was done in order to support the functional
safety cases structure at the case company and a reason as to why the project class
was removed in the TIM. The Storage Location class was introduced as a reference
to the physical location of the artefact, which enables the traceability to various
systems involved in the SaAC development.
5.1.2.1 DRE and their importance to traceability
The results from applying the TIM on the existing cases produced a list of what
classes or references existed in the SaACs. In order to argue for keeping or remov-
ing the classes that were either missing or existing in the cases, existing literature
was investigated. For each class, missing or existing it was found that at least one
source showing evidence for the importance of the element to a SaAC in relation to
traceability. The following contains the argumentation for altering or keeping each
one of the classes in the DRE detailed view of the TIMs classes. The classes that
were removed based on lack of supporting tractability information connection to the
SaAC elements and/or added increased complexity to the model.
Participant Participant information in a TIM regards to the team or person who is
responsible for an artefact. This is included, among other reasons, in order to know
where the artefact stem from but also who to contact when changes are needed. This
is available in the case company’s SaACs provided, but not in any other case that
were found online. There are sources stating the importance of including a partici-
pant in relation to the artefact [12] and based on the experts at the case company,
is a very important aspect of the SaACs traceability. Therefore, the assumption
for the missing participant data in the other cases are that this information was
omitted before submission due to GDPR [39] or that information about the teams
are sensitive data.
Artefact Provenance Artefact provenance is described as follows, “Shows how
the artefact was created and managed over their life cycle, and what techniques and
resources were used in their generation” [40]. In terms of its importance to traceabil-
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ity, when a change is made and an artefact needs updating its important to identify
when in the life-cycle the artefact was created and how.
End User Function Since we are addressing a function safety scenario and all
SaACs in the case company stems from an ’end user function’, this class can not
be omitted. In the industrial setting this study was conducted in, the product was
described as comprised a multitude of end user functions but a SaAC never covered
more than one of these functions. Outside of the particular setting of this study,
all SaAC contain argumentation for why a particular function or system is deemed
appropriately safe [3]. Indicating that the traceability to this artefact is vital for the
model.
Context A context is an encapsulation of an argument, top claim or a claim which
determines the scope of the element. E.g., a context can be the ASIL level given
to the claim. Some changes, such as a minor operational role change, may seem
innocuous at first when given superficial consideration, but actually have a signif-
icant impact with respect to the context and argument of the safety case. Hence,
Changing a context element challenges not only the most immediate associated goal
or strategy but also all of the child goals and strategies underneath that item within
the goal structure [10]. Including a trace link to the context has potential to be
beneficial in order to track dependable changes. Since this justifies its importance
to maintainability and traceability in SaACs, it becomes an important element to
be included in the TIM.
Storage Location The storage location is a representation of the links to where
an artefact in the SaAC are available throughout the various systems that might
be involved. Since artefacts and evidence can be created with and stored within
different tools [41] it is often difficult for practitioners to manage change in SaAC
maintenance. Therefore, keeping the representation of the artefacts physical loca-
tion is valuable. Storage location will provide a dependency link to where a change
should be applied, those links are used in order to track the composition of objects
and manage the repercussion of changes in one on other object that depends on it
[41].
Activity and Technique The activity together with the technique contains the
information that help practitioners identify the event generating each artefact and
the process that specify the steps in order to modify or create it. Event informa-
tion was found to be important for the purpose of change management for SaAC
maintenance. “Change event recognition is useful because it can provide a high-level
documentation of the changes implemented in the requirements specification. This
complements existing change management practices by supporting the process of up-
dating entities related to the change““ [42].
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5.1.3 The Artefact Model
From both the papers this study was inspired by Nair et al. [12] and Taguchi et
al.[18], the artefact was kept as the main focus of the TIM. The artefact represents
an ISO 26262 work product, which is what SaACs will produce in order to comply
with the ISO 26262 standard.
Before the final evaluation of the TIM, the experts expressed that it was not
clear as to what the Artefact class represented. Therefore, the inclusion of an ex-
planatory model (See figure 5.4) has been made, which represents the artefact ab-
stract class encapsulating additional classes that are inherited from the main arte-
fact. This helped the experts in the focus group, the final evaluation, to understand
what the artefact class represented in the TIM in regards to instantiating the arte-
fact class.
Result Artefact
type: ResultType
Description :
An artefact in the form of a
result that is created in the
 process phase
Implementation  Artefact
type: PhaseType
Description :
 An artefact presenting a
solution application
Design Artefact
type: DesignType
Description :
 An artefact in the form of a
design that is used to
 support a claim
Plan Artefact
type: PlanType
Description :
 An artefact in the form of a 
 plan that is used to
 support a claim.
Artefact
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: Status-type
location: String
Version: Number
Description :
ISO 26262  Work product
<<enumeration>>
DesignType
Technical Safety Concept
System Architectural Design
Hardware design
SW architectural design
SW Unit Design
<<enumeration>>
ResultType
Analysis Result
Verification Result 
Integration Test Result
<<enumeration>>
PhaseType
Embedded Software phase
SW Unit Implementation
 phase 
<<enumeration>>
PlanType
safety plan
verification plan
Production Control Plan
Testing Plan
Service Plan
Config Mgmt Plan
Figure 5.4: Artefact Model - a decomposition of the artefact class in the TIM
39
5. Final Results
The Artefact sub-classes are defined as follows:
Artefact: “represents the distinguishable units of data used in a structured as-
surance case” [40].
Result Artefact: An artefact in the form of a result that is created in the process
phase. This class uses the enumeration types that includes: Analysis Result, Veri-
fication Result and Integration Test Result.
Implementation Artefact: An artefact presenting a solution application. This
class uses enumeration types that includes: Embedded Software phase and SW Unit
Implementation phase.
Design Artefact: A design that is used to support a claim. This class uses enumer-
ation types that includes: Technical Safety Concept,System Architectural Design,
Hardware design, SW architectural design and SW Unit Design.
Plan Artefact: A plan that is used to support a claim. This class uses enu-
meration types that includes: Safety plan, Verification plan, Production Control
Plan, Testing Plan, Service Plan and Configuration Management Plan.
The types used in these classes are extracted for the ISO26262 work products
list provided by the case company.
5.1.4 TIM Links and Associations relations
Using the abstract view enabled further detailed identification of the relationships
between elements included in the safety case structure and the development related
ones. It was found that the DRE contributes to the SCSE in terms of creating,
updating information to the SCSE. This indicated that the DRE have an action
oriented effect on the SCSE. In the other direction, the SCSE provides reference
information which are supported in the DRE.
The associations in the SCSE are introduced in order to provide a complete
representation of the structure of the SaAC in the case company and traceability
among the SaAC elements. This is especially demonstrated in the following links:
• Claim - Argument, relation association
• Claim - Piece of Evidence, dependency association
• Claim - Top Claim, inheritance association
• Claim - Context, contextual association
• Argument - Context, contextual association
The remaining associations are necessary in order to provide supporting reference
provenance information.
The associations in the DRE are built around the artefact specification and the
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connection between each type of development process entity towards the core arte-
fact class of the diagram. These associations are directly connected to it, as they
represent the explicit traceability information between them.
In terms of the activity and techniques, the findings indicate that the tech-
nique has an implicit relation to the artefact through the activity. The activity is
responsible of generating and updating artefacts while the techniques specifies the
procedures required in order to conduct the activity. The activity and technique
classes were available in both referenced papers [12, 18]. From a maintenance per-
spective, being able to quickly identify which activity and technique was utilised
in order to perform a rerun of said activity and technique e.g., code tests when a
change has occurred is important.
In regards to the participant class, the case company did have trace links
available to the reviewer of the SaAC but not to the developer or team responsible
for an artefact. Regarding maintenance of the SaAC, introducing an ownership trace
link to the artefact is beneficial for when artefacts has to be updated. The classes
that are added, in addition to the TIM that this study gathered inspiration from
Nair et al. [12] and Taguchi et al. [18], are: Storage location, End user function
and Analysis document. These classes were added based on a combination of data
gathered from the case company’s expert evaluations, available documents, identified
problems and important aspects in existing research on traceability in SaACs.
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6.1 Discussion
The following contains a discussion about the result and answer to the research
question and how they relate to existing studies.
In order to answer the first RQ, the focus of this study became to develop a
TIM based on existing literature and the need from the case company to improve
the maintenance, in particular traceability, in their SaAC. Existing research was
investigated and an attempt was made to translate the findings into a solution
that can be utilised by practitioners in an industrial setting, especially the case
company. Industrial settings contain a lot more variables that are not considered
in an artificial or selective setting that are often simulated in studies in order to
test possible solutions. This study is inspired by Nair et al. [12] and Taguchi et
al. [18] but has been altered substantially in order to be tailored to the automotive
industry with influences from the case company and their needs, but also applied
and augmented based on five open source SaAC from other organisations to validate
and to generalise the findings and results.
In order to build upon these existing solutions in terms of attempting to solve
existing problems regarding SaAC and traceability, the focus have been on the issues
revolving evidence and documents of SaACs are spread over different tools [12, 11].
Introducing traceability to the tools has the potential to facilitate this known issue.
Additionally, an issue that was heavily focused on is the requirement hierarchy that
SaAC are built around and has to adhere to. Implementing traceability between
requirements, claims and evidence is vital for the practitioners in order to facilitate
their work in maintaining SaAC.
In regards to the problems faced by the case company in terms of maintain-
ability, the experts in the case company agree on that the study and its results, in
particular the TIM, has made them realise gaps in their current guidelines and in-
structions which the TIM will aid them in solving. These issues are mainly regarding
the maintainability of the SaACs that has been overlooked until now. Introducing
the traceability links established in the TIM will help them improve the guidelines
to not only cover creation but also maintenance. The model will also help in iden-
tifying which traceability links are already available in the company’s systems and
enable the identification of the missing links.
In terms of generalise-ability, the model was deemed general enough to be
applied on different types of products. This was just the experts’ impression but
it was expressed that this would of course have to be tested in order to verify but
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no initial issues with the model in terms of generalisation internally in the company
was expressed. The TIM has the possible potential and is general enough to be
implemented on any SaAC with minimum changes depending on the structure and
safety standard that each industrial setting will comprise of.
Research Question 1.1 asks, How can we describe the relevant relationships
among artefacts and elements of the SaAC? As discovered in the first iteration of
the study, there are many possible solutions to introduce traceability in SaAC but
based on the results from existing literature and the experts at the case company,
creating and implementing a TIM has seen the most promising results in this area.
Mader et al. [43] describes the reasons for implementing and benefits of using
a TIM to introduce traceability in any system as follows; In projects with multiple
stakeholders, the implementation of a TIM will ensure consistency in the result.
Tracing information can be very complex and a TIM will facilitate creating the
trace links and improve the process of validating changes made to the elements
that are encapsulated in the model. Additionally, the author states that a TIM is
necessary for automated traceability handling.
Based on the findings from the first iteration the assumption can be made that
creating a TIM and implementing it into the structure of the way of working with
SaAC will aid in identifying and maintaining traceability between the elements of
an SaAC. Both the structure of the SaAC and the GSN elements required to create
a case but also to link these structural elements to the evidence and documents
created during the development process related to safety assurance will facilitate
maintenance of SaACs in an industrial setting.
Research Question 1.2 asks, What are the relevant relationships among arte-
facts and elements of the SaACs? After finding a sound method on how to im-
plement a structure for realising the relationships between element and artefacts in
a SaAC it was needed to figure out how these relationships can be identified and
subsequently be implemented in the TIM. The development of the TIM and the
evolution of the model based on the expert evaluation in the second iteration of the
study progressed the study towards the goal of identifying the correct relationships
and what classes are relevant for traceability in SaACs. The work was closely con-
ducted with the case company to identify the structure and elements used for SaAC
creation in order to translate those aspects in to the TIM.
For the third and final iteration an attempt was made to generalise the findings
based on existing literature and other SaAC available online. Some interesting
insights were found in applying the TIM to these cases and the changes made to the
TIM in order to adhere to those structures did not conflict with the application of
the TIM to the case company’s SaAC, but rather improved upon it. Indicating that
a more generalised solution could be beneficial to the application of the TIM in an
industrial setting even though not tailored to a specific case. Additionally, applying
the TIM on a SaAC [2] that was substantially larger and more complex than the
case company’s SaAC strongly verified the known issue expressed in previous studies
that both maintenance of a SaAC and the implementation of a TIM can take a
substantial amount of time to utilise. This indicates that it is important to find a
way to integrate the trace links and the model into the industrial cases in a manner
as to not create a considerable amount of overhead, which would be an interesting
44
6. Conclusion
topic for any future work performed based on the insights made in this study.
Additionally, the focus group evaluation with the experts in different areas of
working with SaACs at the case company helped provide insights into by whom this
model will be used and how it could improve their way of working. To utilise this
model it is first important to assess the structure and hierarchy of an industrial set-
ting. In the case company’s structure, there are process developers whom will apply
the model and integrate it into the way of working at the company. The develop-
ers will have to adapt their development process to adhere to these new guidelines
but will probably not be interacting directly with the TIM. The instructions and
guidelines on how to write SaACs at the company will be augmented and enhanced
with the help of the TIM together with the findings and insights from the results
of this study. This insight is in unison with one of the reasons to implement a TIM
described by Mader et al. [43] as follows; Practitioners, who did not create the
model, who will be interacting with the TIM in one way or another need to know
how it is defined and what to expect from working with it. By integrating the TIM
in to the guidelines and instructions at the case company the model will be utilised
indirectly by developers and fewer drastic changes in the way of working will have
to be implemented.
The TIM created is a part of a much bigger scope in terms of maintainability,
there are processes and methods that needs to be put in place in order to further
improve the maintainability of a SaAC and additionally to fully utilise the TIM. For
the sake of a viable scope for this study, the TIM was the only part of the bigger
picture that was fully investigated and created.
The links between some artefacts and work products were expressed as already
available and used at the case company. Versions of all the artefacts are available
in their version control system. The practitioners discussed implicit and explicit
traceability. The implicit traceability was referred to as elements and components
having the same name, which was said to be non ideal. The experts sees potential
with the TIM to explicitly identify which links are available in the systems and that
they would not be sure about what links they already have until the model has
been implemented. “We have some of these (links), but definitely not all the links
that we want and are needed” was expressed by one practitioners on which the rest
agreed. Development process elements are not traced at all in the current state of
the company.
The company’s goal for the future is to implement the TIM into their de-
velopment platform for embedded systems. In that scenario the Tool developers
of the company will work to integrate the model into their tool and the TIM will
then become an integral and fundamental map of how each element regarding their
safety culture and safety assurance is structured and linked together. Every com-
pany structure is different and the presence of a development platform tool is not a
given.
Even though it is plausible the TIM can be utilised in a beneficial way regard-
less of company structure and the availability of tools to support it, the additional
workload that will have to be done is unsure and out of scope for this study. It is
however, an interesting question that should be investigated in the future.
Answering both sub-questions, has led to an answer for RQ.1, How can we
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trace the relevant relationships in SaAC and the containing elements to their relevant
development artefacts? In order to be able to maintain a SaAC, one needs to be
able to update the case when a change occurs. A big aspect of this updating process
is to easily be able to identify what parts of the case could have been affected by
the change. Traceability between the elements and artefacts in a SaAC will tell the
practitioner(s) working on the case which other elements, linked to the element in
which the change was made, might have been impacted.
In the focus group evaluation session, a participant stated how the TIM would
help them redefine their structure in terms of working with SaAC creation by in-
troducing, based on the insights made from the TIM, a maintainability structure in
to their way of working from these trace links. If the model contains all the cor-
rect links between elements in the SaAC, this would mean that every one of those
links represent that a change will have an impact on its linked elements when a
change is made. E.g., If an element is connected by an association to three other
elements, all three of those elements should be analysed and updated accordingly
when a change is made to the first element. Subsequently, the links connected to
those three elements will also have to be checked for any impact of the change. The
TIM facilities this chain of changes and has the potential to decrease the time to
update the cascading change impact on the elements that are linked together.
In addition to the answers to our RQs, a few interesting topics were uncovered
that are worth discussing.
First, even though the TIM was seen as possessing potential to help increasing
maintenance and traceability in the SaAC at the case company, the practise of
utilising the TIM for the creation and maintenance of safety cases were thought to
add a lot of extra time to create the trace links between all components and artefacts
across tools and formats. The findings in this study and the TIM created could be
the base of future studies focusing on automating the creation and instantiation of
the trace links expressed in the TIM. This would address one core issue in SaAC
expressed by multiple existing studies that is creating and maintain SaAC is a
cumbersome and time consuming task which often become very complex as the
product grows in size. This is an important issue that has to be solved in order to
facilitate the work practitioners are doing with SaACs.
Second, while there were strong indications of the value of the Traceability
Information Model produced within this study, there is a need to utilise it in a
ongoing project to see how it fares during a normal project life-cycle instead of
a simulated environment such as the workshop performed for the evaluation. A
comparison between utilising the TIM as solely a maintenance model, implementing
it on an already finished product, versus an ongoing product during the development
phase would evaluate in which state of the product and its life-cycle the TIM is most
optimal to introduce. While the focus of the study was maintenance in SaAC, the
TIM should tested in the development of a product in order to establish the trace
links between the elements as a continuous process. Since the TIM will grow in sync
with the product, attempting to implement the TIM once the product is complete
and enters the maintenance phase will take a lot of time and effort which will perhaps
be off putting for many practitioners.
Finally, the case company has expressed their desire to move all documents,
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processes and information storage to the application utilised at the company. The
tool is a development platform for embedded systems. As of the date of publication,
the case company has only expressed the wish for moving everything in to the utilised
tool while the state of their documents and information is still spread over multiple
tools and sources. Future work in this area of this study and a way to simplify the
associations and increase the maintainability of a product is to introduce the TIM
and its trace links into the development platform along with all documents and
information stored in the application as well. This would enable practitioners to
link the classes in the TIM to the documents in the application and make the trace
links not just between the artefacts and elements but also link everything to the
TIM in a simple and straightforward way, using the TIM as an embedded model of
their tool to structure and link all relevant information together. Implementing the
appropriate trace links into the development platform will however be manual work,
but since the model only represents the elements and the relationships between those
elements this model is independent of which tool an organisation utilise.
6.1.1 Recommendations to improve Traceability
In terms of implementing traceability, there are existing studies that advocate a more
brute-force approach in which all requirements are thoroughly traced across the life
cycle of a system or product [44, 41]. The aim for these recommendations were to
find a more pragmatic approach. A list of recommendations in the paper ’Strategic
Traceability for safety-Critical Projects’ has been provided to apply traceability
strategically in safety-critical projects to systematically build a case for product
safety and support the assessment process [45]. The recommendations introduce
practices which can be used in order to establish traceability that is cost-effective
and provides effective support for constructing a safety-critical system and assessing
its safety.
In addition to these guidelines, the following are a few suggestions that are
proposed based on the work conducted in this study and the main takeaways that
have been discovered along the way. It is important to include stakeholders with
different roles, when developing the TIM design. As seen when the model was eval-
uated, experts of different roles provide comprehensive feedback on the trace link
information that would otherwise be difficult to attain. It is important to repre-
sent how these trace-links are constructed in the TIM and investigate the strategic
value of representing that information in the TIM. These practices are particularly
important as they provide a sustainable solution that consider traceability from the
very beginning of the development life cycle of any product. In order to ensure
that the added value of using a TIM is achieved, providing information about the
relationships among artefacts and elements of the SaAC is crucial. The information
is needed both initially and continuously during the life cycle of a SaAC, starting
from structuring the SaAC and the development process.
The potential users are the people working on process development, develop-
ment of “the way of working", the employees that audit and review SaACs and the
ones who develop the instructions and guidelines to create and maintain SaACs.
In order to establish how to work with the TIM, the model needs to be integrated
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into the way of working and the process related to creating and maintaining SaAC.
The process developers will therefore be directly affected by the model and most
possibly will be the ones to implement the TIM. Indirectly affected by the TIM and
the process revolving it will be the developers. They will only be affected in the way
the process of how their work is done will be performed. Other potential users of
the TIM will be the tool developers. A possibility that was explored and discussed
in the focus group was that the company will be able to utilise the currently used
tool to integrate the traceability model into. Tool support to create SaAC is impor-
tant to the case company and utilising the TIM will help describe and capture the
important aspect of implementing traceability in the SaACs. The model will also
be useful to identify what traceability links are not available or created today. This
solution is by no means constrained by the development process tool utilised at other
industrial settings and integrating the TIM into the utilised tool is recommended if
this possible solution is desired.
While the TIM might not see the best results in the hands of the developers,
but rather to the process developers. A simplified model, based on the TIM could
possibly be given to the developers to facilitate their work with the new guidelines
for traceability.
6.2 Conclusion
The results of this study has provided substantial indications of the importance
of implementing a TIM to support SaACs maintainability. This was accomplished
by investigating available literature findings in this area, supported with an evalu-
ation in the shape of a workshop with experts working with SaAC. Using a TIM
has been found to be an suitable model to describe the relationships among SaAC
elements and artefacts. Working through three iterations, the TIM design has been
able to evolve in a fundamental way. The evolution process included mapping the
TIM to various sources which were; the SaAC from the case company and another
five SaAC form various organisations and research papers. This accomplished a
generalised solution, which has shown indications to the identification of what the
relationships among SaAC that should address and represent in the TIM. The devel-
oped TIM comprises two types of traceability information, which are: traceability
among the SaAC elements and traceability information that references development
artefacts and elements required to support the SaAC. This representation visualises
how the structure of a SaAC, that is used in an industrial setting, has a strong
impact on specifying the traces which should be created and maintained between
SaAC artefacts and development process elements. Developing a TIM to document
this information has provided a clear view to various stakeholders regarding the im-
portance of traces to the SaAC and how this approach could be integrated into the
development platform and process. A strategic planing of how to use the TIM is
needed to make sure that appropriate stakeholders are informed and included from
the very beginning, as well as defining working procedures that integrates the TIM.
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6.2.1 Future Work
Even though this study has dealt with plausible progress in terms of the issue of
dealing with evidence found in various tools and formats, the issues regarding com-
plexity and scale is still very present. A possible viable future solution to this is to
make an attempt to utilise the TIM created and the insights gained to automate the
creation and maintenance of SaACs. This is a necessary implementation in order
to save time and increase efficiency. Additionally, work regarding the integration of
the TIM into the strategic planing and work process guidelines in the automotive
industry is required.
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Figure A.7: Iteration 3 - Applying TIM to SaAC [2]
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Development Process 
Elements
Claim
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
a proposition statement
about the system 
Refers
1..*
0..*
Supports
0..* 0..*
refers
0..*
0..*
Reference
1..*
0..*
PieceOfEvidence
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
Objective artefact being
offered in support of one
 or more claims
EvidenceProvenance
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
Used to build a repository of
 evidence that communicates
its provenance and how
 it was gathered
Characterizes 
1..*
0..*
Argument
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
information presented to 
establish claims 
Context
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
involves assumptions made
about the system and its
 environment
Creates
/
Updates
Characterizes Allocates
Safety Case Structure 
Elements
Analysis Document
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
Simulation results ,
(supporting documents)
Sub-Claim
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
A child class of the main
class (Claim).represent
 sub-claim structure
Is
responsible
for 
1
0..*
Generates
1
0..*
Artefact
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: Status-type
location: String
Description :
ISO 26262  Work product
0..*
1
Stores
Characterizes 
1..*
0..*
Top Claim
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
A child class of the main 
class (Claim).represent
 Top-claim structure
Relates to
1
1..*
Relates to 
Supports
1
1
References
1..*
0..*
refrence
0..*
0..*
Refrences
1..* 1..* 1..*
1..*
1..*
Supports
Relates
input to
0..*
0..*
Artefact
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: Status-type
location: String
Version; number
Description :
ISO 26262  Work product
ArtefactProvenance
ID: String
name: String
description: String
timeStamp: Date
Description :
Characteristics that relate to
information regarding the
lifecycle and management
responsibility
Storage Location
ID: String
name: String
description: String
status: StatusType
location: String
Description :
A particular form of an
artefact differing in certain
 respects from an
earlier form or other forms
Participant
ID: String
name: String
description: String
role: String
phone: String
email: String
Description :
Individual or team in charge
of an artefact or a piece of
evidence
End User Function 
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
a function that needs to be
introduced with the product
Activity
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
like hazard analysis activity 
unit of work that produces
 or modifies an artifacts
Technique:
ID: String
name: String
description: String
Description :
how to perform the activity
to create the artifact 
Figure A.8: Iteration 3 - After focus group, final version
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A.0.2 Change log - TIM
A.0.2.1 Changes TIM v.1-2
List of changes between TIM version 1 to 2 (A.1-A.2):
• Removed the class “Risk reduction measure“
• Removed the class “Product“
• Added association between the classes “Safety plan“ and “Activity“
• Removed association between the classes “Safety plan“ and “Safety require-
ment“
• Changed the association between the classes “Artefact“ and “End user func-
tion“ to be “relates to“ instead of “used to generate“
X
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A.0.2.2 Changes TIM v.2-3
List of changes between TIM version 2 to 3 (A.2-A.3):
• Added the class “Safety goals“
• Added the class “Analysis document“
• Added the class “Storage location“
• Removed the class “Acceptance critera“
• Removed the class “Acceptance plan“
• Removed the class “Acceptance process“
• Removed the class “EvidenceRelationship“
• Removed the class “Risk tollerability criteria“
• Added association between the classes “Activity“ and “Artefact“
• Added association between the classes “Safety requirement specification“ and
“Safety goals“
• Added association between the classes “Safety requirement specification“ and
“EvidenceProvenance“
• Removed association between the classes “Technique“ and the class “Artefact“
• Changed the association between the classes “Technique“ and “Activity“ to a
dependency association
• Changed the association between the classes “Claim“ and “PieceOfEvidence“
to a dependency association
• Changed the association between the classes “EvidenceProvenance“ and “Piece-
OfEvidence“ from “relates to“ to “characterize“
• Changed the association between the classes “Version“ and “Artefact“ from
“differentiates“ to “has“
• Changed the association between the classes “ArtefactProvenance“ and “Arte-
fact“ from “influence“ to “characterize“
• Changed the association between the classes “ReferenceArtefact“ and “Arte-
fact“ from “defines“ to “relates to“
• Renamed the class “Safety Requirement“ to “Safety requirement specification“
XI
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A.0.2.3 Changes TIM v.3-4
List of changes between TIM version 3 to 4 (A.3-A.4):
• Added the class “Context“
• Removed the class “Safety plan“
• Removed the class “Safety Goals“
• Added association between the classes “Safety Requirement Specification“ and
“Claim“
• Changed the association between the classes “Activity“ and “Artefact“ form
“1“ to “1..*“
• Changed the association between the classes “PieceOfEvidence“ and “Eviden-
ceProvenance“ form “1“ to “0..*“
XII
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A.0.2.4 Changes TIM v.4-5
List of changes between TIM version 4 to 5 (A.4-A.8):
• Added the class “Top Claim“
• Added the class “Sub Claim“
• Added the class “Development process element“
• Removed the class “Version“
• Removed the class “Safety Requirement Specification“
• Removed the class “ArtefactReference“
• Added bi-directional association between the classes “Artefact“ and “Activity“
• Added association between the classes “Claim“ and “Argument“
• Added association between the classes “Context“ and “Claim“
• Added association between the classes “Claim“ and “Claim“
• Added inheritance association between the classes “Top claim“ and “Claim“
• Changed the association between the classes “Claim“ and “Analysis document“
from “accomplish“ to “reference“
• Changed the association between the classes “Artefact“ and “Activity“ from
a 1..* relationship to 0..*
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A.0.3 Particpant observation field notes
XIV
A. Appendix 1
#1 
Site:  Redacted 
Date:  23/11-2019 
Start:  13:00 
End:  15:00 
 
Notes:  In  a  meeting  with  five  employees  from  the  case  company,  they  are  discussing  the 
current  state  of  their  SaACs  process  and  what  they  have  in  terms  of  data  so  far.  The  team 
that  is  discussing  the  topic  is  the  functional  safety  team  at  the  organization  and  they  are 
holding  this  meeting  in  order  for  everyone  to  have  the  same  information  about  the  current 
state  and  situation  at  the  company.  There  are  no  complete  safety  cases  at  the  company  right 
now  that  adheres  to  the  ISO  26262  safety  standards,  but  they  are  working  on  it.  To  comply 
with  this  standard  became  mandatory  last  year  (2018)  so  it  is  important  that  they  start 
adhering  to  the  standard  as  soon  as  possible  and  that  everyone  is  aware  of  this.  The  senior 
staff  of  the  team  is  sceptical  to  utilizing  any  tools  and  have  themselves  looked  into  a  range  of 
these  but  were  not  impressed.  They  think  it  is  better  to  focus  on  their  own  process  and 
structure  to  fully  comprehend  the  scope  of  this  standard  and  how  to  work  with  it  before 
introducing  any  tools.  They  are  using  word  documents  to  write  their  safety  case  but 
expresses  that  this  is  an  issue  for  traceability  and  maintainability.  They  want  to  find 
something  else  to  use  that  is  easier  to  trace  the  documents  between  each  other  and  to 
easily  keep  them  up  to  date.  The  modelling  structure  they  are  using  for  their  SaACs  is  and 
will  be  GSN,  this  will  not  change  since  it  is  a  very  common  modelling  language  for  SaACs 
and  they  want  to  go  with  the  standards.  In  terms  of  the  work  process,  the  case  company 
does  not  develop  their  SaACs  as  a  parallel  thing  to  the  development  for  function  safety,  it  is 
part  of  the  normal  development  process  and  the  developers  working  on  a  safety  related 
feature  or  part  of  a  feature  will  then  write  that  part  of  the  SaAC.  That  is  also  a  reason  why 
they  do  not  want  to  introduce  too  many  tools  since  these  developers  are  doing  it  and  would 
have  to  learn  a  lot  in  addition  to  their  development  process  which  they  want  to  avoid.  
 
Reflection:  The  case  company  is  now  forced  to  adhere  to  new  safety  standards  and  are 
trying  to  figure  out  a  process  for  doing  so  that  is  efficient  but  also  does  not  impose  too  many 
new  tools  on  their  developers.  Some  pilot  attempts  have  been  made,  but  are  not  complete, 
to  develop  SaACs  using  the  Goal  Structuring  Notation  modeling  structure  and  have  been 
faced  with  some  difficulties.  These  difficulties  include  the  traceability  and  maintenance  for 
the  cases.  
 
  
Figure A.9: Participant observation, 23/11/2019
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#2 
Site:  Redacted 
Date:  26/11-2019 
Start:  13:00 
End:  15:00 
 
Notes:  This  meeting  was  a  continuation  of  the  one  held  three  days  prior  since  it  turned  out 
there  was  a  lot  to  discuss  and  make  sure  everyone  was  up  to  speed.  The  focus  of  this 
meeting  is  what  structures  and  processes  they  have  in  place  but  also  what  they  need  to 
implement.  The  instructions  and  guidelines  on  how  to  write  a  safety  case  exist  and  has  been 
validated  and  it  is  clear  what  information  is  needed  to  fill  a  SaAC.  However,  what  is  not  clear 
is  how  to  build  a  SaAC  that  is  easy  to  maintain  or  what  methods  are  needed  to  do  so.  The 
most  important  part  of  this  to  the  company  is  how  to  improve  the  traceability  and  make 
updates  accordingly  when  changes  occur.  The  most  difficult  changes  to  handle  today  is  the 
change  to  requirements  because  their  structure  is  quite  complicated.  Other  aspects  of 
traceability  which  are  difficult  today  but  which  are  also  very  important  is  the  traceability  to  the 
level  of  part  numbers  that  needs  to  be  included  in  the  SaACs.  The  solution  the  company  is 
looking  for  is  for  us  to  improve  traceability  in  order  to  see  what  artefacts  are  impacted  if  one 
changes  and  where  to  find  all  the  artefacts  across  the  different  storage  tools  that  are  used  in 
the  company.  For  their  SaACs  in  the  company  they  are  looking  for  some  kind  of 
generalization  to  cover  the  safety  of  all  the  products  they  are  developing.  Again  the  people 
are  reminded  that  they  do  not  want  to  introduce  any  tools  to  work  with  safety  as  of  today  and 
it  is  stated  that  it  is  first  important  to  know  exactly  what  you  want  to  do  and  how  it  is  done 
before  introducing  tools  to  do  it  for  you.  Although,  whatever  process  and  methods  are 
chosen  in  order  to  implement  this,  it  is  important  that  it  is  possible  to  integrate  them  with  the 
development  lifecycle.  The  goal  is  when  the  product  reaches  production,  everything  should 
be  consistent.  This  meaning  the  SaACs  and  the  product  itself  should  be  consistent, 
complete  and  up  to  date.  
 
Reflection:  The  focus  of  the  case  company  in  terms  of  improving  their  process  of  SaACs  is 
not  how  to  structure  the  cases  or  what  information  is  needed,  but  where  to  find  the 
information  in  the  various  tools  they  use  and  the  connection/traceability  between  the  different 
information.  The  connection  between  the  various  documents  and  resources  are  very 
important  to  the  company  so  they  can  easily  see  which  parts  might  be  impacted  during  a 
change  and  where  to  find  these  parts.  
 
  
Figure A.10: Participant observation, 26/11/2019
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#3 
Site:  Redacted 
Date:  27/2-2020 
Start:  14:00 
End:  16:00 
 
Notes:  In  this  meeting,  between  four  employees  at  the  case  company,  a  progress  report  was 
held  by  the  Safety  Case  Manager  in  the  department  where  one  of  the  SaACs  was  being 
developed.  The  manager  states  that  the  SaAC  is  close  to  complete.  However,  the  instruction 
and  SaAC  might  not  fully  match  because  the  case  is  not  complying  with  all  of  what  is 
included  in  the  ISO  26262  standard.  Why?  Because  the  SaAC  was  started  on  before  the 
instructions  and  guidelines  were  complete.  The  instructions  are  built  in  order  to  comply  with 
the  standard.  While  working  on  the  SaAC  the  main  issues  regards  the  process  of  functional 
safety  requirements  being  broken  down  into  technical  safety  requirements.  Traceability  is  the 
main  problem.  Linking  the  different  levels  of  requirements  to  the  evidence  is  very  difficult  with 
this  requirement  structure.  The  available  safety  case  instructions  do  not  address  how  to 
handle  changes  to  the  features  nor  claims.  Even  a  small  thing  as  new  part  numbers  can 
trigger  a  complete  redoing  of  the  validation  process  for  a  SaAC.  There  are  continuously  a  lot 
of  changes  to  these  products  and  therefore  the  SaACs..  Changes  on  feature  level  will  impact 
the  SaAC,  changes  to  requirements,  new  part  numbers  and  many  other  aspects  can  cause 
great  impact  on  the  case.  Changing  small  stuff  will  force  rerun  of  tests  and  validations  (for 
example  changing  part  number).  It  doesn’t  have  to  be  a  big  change  to  the  entire  case  but 
just  a  part  of  it.  If  we  could  clearly  see  which  artefacts  of  the  SaAC  are  connected  to  the 
other  documents,  we  could  save  time  and  might  not  have  to  redo  it  all.As  of  today,  word  and 
excel  templates  are  used  to  write  SaACs  at  the  company  but  they  aim  to  move  towards 
using  an  application  called  system  weaver  instead  to  store  everything  in  the  future.  Today 
they  only  generate  reports  from  the  tool  and  store  some  of  it  in  a  long  term  database/storage 
called  Phoenix.  Other  information  is  stored  in,  among  others,  JIRA,  Github  and  sharepoint. 
Traceability  between  requirements  and  technical  artefacts  are  handled  different  in  different 
teams.There  are  some  traceability  guidelines  that  are  about  to  be  adopted 
 
Reflection:  The  employees  discussed  the  current  state  of  the  SaACs  under  development 
but  also  talked  about  the  difficulties  and  strategies  to  move  forward  with  their  work  in  this 
area.  The  compliance  with  the  ISO  26262  standard  is  lacking  in  the  current  cases.  They 
discussed  their  main  issue  which  is  how  the  requirements  are  broken  down  and  the 
traceability  issues  that  arise  from  that  structure  in  relation  to  the  evidence  in  the  SaACs. 
Another  big  issue  they  are  facing  with  the  lack  of  traceability  is  when  changes  occur. 
Complete  reruns  of  the  validation  process  are  carried  out  because  the  practitioners  are  not 
sure  which  parts  of  the  case  possibly  got  affected  by  the  change  because  they  do  not  have 
the  trace  links  which  would  show  which  of  the  parts  that  are  connected. 
 
  
Figure A.11: Participant observation, 27/2/2020
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#4 
Site:  Redacted 
Date:  5/3-2020 
Start:  13:00 
End:  16:00 
 
Notes:  A  function  safety  workshop  was  held  by  one  of  the  senior  members  of  the  functional 
safety  team  at  the  case  company.  This  workshop  was  conducted  in  order  to  educate  the 
function  safety  staff  and  managers  about  the  ISO  26262  standard  and  how  to  write  SaACs 
that  comply  with  said  standard.  Eight  people  attended  the  workshop  excluding  the 
researchers  of  this  study.  The  ISO  lifecycle  model  was  explained  and  that  the  results  would 
produce  the  work  products  that  would  later  be  used  as  evidence  in  a  SaAC.  The  lifecycle 
comprise  of  the  following  steps: 
 
1. Item  definition 
2. Hazard  analysis 
3. Specification  of  functional  safety  concept 
4. Specification  of  technical  safety  concepts 
5. Development  and  verification  SW  &  HW 
6. Item  testing  and  integration 
7. Safety  validation 
8. Functional  safety  assessment 
9. Production 
10. Operation,  service,  decommission 
 
This  means  that  a  complete  safety  case  would  always  produce  the  work  products  needed  in 
order  to  comply  with  the  standard.  The  next  thing  discussed  is  the  requirement  hierarchy 
utilized  at  the  company.  The  top-most  requirement  in  this  scenario  is  called  a  safety  goal 
which  is  allocated  to  an  item.  An  item  being  the  ISO  26262  work  product.  To  make  one 
function  many  safety  goals  are  grouped  to  cover  all  safety  related  concerns.  These  safety 
goals  are  then  broken  down  into  different  functional  safety  requirements  which  are  then 
allocated  to  main  elements  (subsystems)  of  the  items.  When  that  is  done,  functional  safety 
requirements  are  broken  down  into  technical  safety  requirements  which  are  then  allocated  to 
elements  at  different  levels.  The  complexity  increases  since  technical  safety  requirements 
can  be  further  broken  down  into  smaller  technical  requirements.  Technical  safety 
requirements  are  then  broken  down  into  hardware  safety  requirements  and  software  safety 
requirements  which  are  then  allocated  to  hardware  and  software  elements  respectively.  The 
importance  of  developing  a  safety  case  as  a  continuous  process  during  development  was 
expressed  clearly.  
 
Reflection:  A  thorough  presentation  of  the  ISO  26262  standard  and  the  company’s 
strategies  and  issues  were  given.  In  the  E/E  systems  that  the  company  develops  and  work 
with,  with  the  ISO  26262  standard,  a  pressing  issue  is  the  requirement  hierarchy  and  how  to 
address  that  in  a  SaACs.  
Figure A.12: Participant observation, 5/3/2020
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A.0.4 Safety Assurance Case comparison
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Figure A.13: Availability of TIM classes in analysed SaACs
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A.0.5 Focus group
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Focus  group  questions:  
●  
● What  are  the  potential  uses  of  the  model? 
○ Where? 
○ How? 
● What  value  do  you  see  in  using  this  model? 
○ If  not:  what  is  missing  in  order  to  create  value  for  the  company  and  your 
process? 
○ Is  there  something  missing  and/or  is  there  something  that  is  not  needed  
● Are  the  classes  in  the  model  clear?  
● What  do  you  think  they  represent  and  how  do  they  relate  to  the  safety  cases? 
● Are  the  associations  clear  and  make  sense ? 
○ If  not,  elaborate 
● Do  you  have  tools  that  support  creating  the  links  represented  in  the  model? 
● Are  the  information  of  the  links  already  available  in  the  Volvo  systems? 
● What  are  the  challenges  you  foresee  using  this  model? 
● Any  additional  comments/insights? 
Figure A.14: Focus group questionnaire
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ID Current  Position Years  of  SaAC 
Experience 
Interests  related  to 
SaAC 
1 Specialist  Functional  Safety  - 
System  Engineer  at  Powertrain 
Engineering  (PE),  acting  safety 
manager  for  a  project  at  PE.  Formal 
specialist  role  in  embedded  SW 
(specifically  functional  safety),  my 
task  is  to  implement  and  drive 
functional  safety  (ISO  26262)  at  PE. 
ST:  6  years,  since 
2014.  Also  worked 
functional  safety  for 
off  road 
vehicles/machines 
for  a  year  long  time 
ago. 
ST:  I  review  safety 
cases  from  suppliers. 
It  is  common  that  the 
safety  case  is  a  list  of 
work  products,  like 
test  reports  etc.  It  is 
interesting  to 
compare  with  the 
way  where  we  work 
with  claims. 
2 Senior  Principal  Functional  Safety 
Engineer  at  Electrical  Department 
(ESA)  at  Volvo  GTT 
  20+ maintenance,  reuse 
and  automatic 
creation  
3 Principal  System  Design  Engineer, 
Functional  Safety  Specialist 
~25  years Structure  and 
contents  (including 
relationships 
between  claims, 
arguments  and 
evidence)  of  the 
reasoning  in  the 
safety  assurance 
case. 
 
Maintenance  of  an 
existing  safety 
assurance  case 
when  changes  are 
made  in  the 
associated  system. 
4 Functional  Safety  Manager  – 
Chassis  Technology  department  – 
Volvo  GTT 
4,5  years Efficient  creation  of 
cases,  traceability, 
maintenance/re-use, 
safety  cases  for 
automated  driving 
applications 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A.15: Focus group participant information
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A.0.6 Study Participants
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ID Role Workshop- face-to-face 
Expert 
Evaluation  1 
-  face-to-face 
Expert 
Evaluation 
2  -  Online 
Focus 
group  - 
Online 
1 Specialist  Functional  Safety X   X 
2 Senior  Principal  Functional 
Safety  Engineer  at  Electrical 
Department  (ESA)  at  Volvo 
GTT 
X X X X 
3 Principal  System  Design 
Engineer,  Functional  Safety 
Specialist 
X X X X 
4 Functional  Safety  Manager X X  X 
5 Functional  Safety  Manager X X   
6 Acting  Manager  in  the 
Functional  Safety  Team  at 
GTT 
X    
7 Development  engineer X    
8 Global  Technology  Manager, 
Electrical/Electronic  Platform 
X    
9 Lead  System  Design 
Engineer 
X    
10 System  Architect  Hardware X    
 
 
  
Figure A.16: Participant information, evaluation methods
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A.0.7 Related work methods and approaches for traceabil-
ity to support SaAC
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Reference solution Description  
[12] SafeTIM, 
traceability information model for 
safety evidence 
A study based on a systematic literature review 
and a survey 
[9] Safety Artifact Forest 
Analysis (SAFA), 
 
leverages traceability to automatically  compare 
software artifacts from a previously approved or 
certified version with a new version of the 
system. 
Where they identify, visualize, and 
explain changes in a Delta Tree. 
[14]  component-based design, contracts, 
modular assurance cases, and 
continuous assessment to enable 
continuous deployment in the 
context of product lines. 
 
combining the use of component-based design, 
contracts, and modular assurance cases with 
agile practices, we can achieve continuous 
assurance cases that evolve and are assessed in 
the same pace as,and together with, the product. 
[16] present two techniques that utilise 
safety contracts 
to facilitate the maintenance of 
safety cases, 
 
• Sensitivity Analysis for 
Enabling Safety Argument 
Maintenance (SANESAM) 
•  SANESAM+ 
apply sensitivity analysis on FTAs to measure the 
sensitivity of outcome A (e.g., a safety 
requirement being true) to a change in a 
parameter B 
 
SANESAM+: 
consider the change’s impact on: 
(1) intermediate events of FTAs, (2) multiple 
events, and (3) duplicated events. 
[18] meta-model which describes the 
relationship between the two and 
present a case study taken 
from IEC 62278/EN 50126 from 
railway systems to show how 
linking traceability to GSN (Goal Structuring 
Notation) using the Traceability Information 
Model (TIM). 
 
They built a TIM and GSN diagrams 
 
Figure A.17: Additional tools for traceability approaches for SaAC
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[18] meta-model which describes the 
relationship between the two and present a 
case study taken 
from IEC 62278/EN 50126 from railway 
systems to show how 
traceability and safety cases benefit each other 
 
linking traceability to GSN (Goal Structuring 
Notation) using the Traceability Information 
Model (TIM). 
 
They built a TIM and GSN diagrams 
 
new criteria for validation of GSN in terms of 
traceability and showed a 
partial evaluation in the case study based on 
those criteria. 
[32] introduce a methodology and a tool chain for 
establishing a safety argument, plus the 
evidence to prove the argument 
use the goal structuring notation to 
decompose and refine  
safety claims into sub- 
claims until they can be proven by evidence.  
 
The evidence comes from 
 
tracing the safety requirements of the system 
into their respective devel- 
opment artifacts in which they are realized. 
 
[33] Exploit the weaving model for automated 
generation of assurance cases. 
 
 discuss how a seamless model- 
driven approach to assurance cases can be 
achieved and examine the utility of increased 
formality and automation. 
[34] present six 
precision improvement techniques illustrated 
on a GSN safety case used 
with ISO 26262. 
 
Used wordGSN-IA: GSN Impact Assessment 
Algorithm 
 
Figure A.18: Additional tools for traceability approaches for SaAC
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